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The Legal Response to International Water Scarcity and Water Conflicts: 
The UN Watercourses Convention and Beyond1 
Dr. Patricia Wouters* 
 
1. Introduction 
The UN Watercourses Convention, adopted in May 1997,2 and ratified to date by 
six Parties,3 is a global framework agreement with the goal to “ensure the utilisation, 
development, conservation, management and protection of international watercourses” 
and the promotion of their optimal and sustainable utilisation for present and future 
generations.4 In line with this, the Convention requires that “an international watercourse 
shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and 
sustainable utilisation thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of 
the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the 
watercourse”.5 This paper addresses the question whether the UN Watercourses 
Convention facilitates achievement of these aims, specifically in the context of conflicts-
of-uses and water scarcity.    
 
                                               
* Dr. Patricia Wouters, Director, Water Law and Policy Programme, CEPMLP, University of Dundee, 
Scotland, DD1 4HN, The UK. E-mail: p.k.wouters@dundee.ac.uk. Website: 
http:/www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/waterlaw  
 
The author would like to thank Dr. Sergei Vinogradov, Senior Research Fellow, CEPMLP, Univeristy of 
Dundee, and Patricia Jones, Research Associate, Water Law and Policy Programme, University of Dundee 
for their assistance with this paper.  
 
 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 
May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (not yet entered into force). 
2 GA Res. A/RES/51/229 of 21 May 1999. 
3 The Parties are Finland, Jordan, Lebanon, Norway, South Africa and Syria. The signatories include Côte 
d’Ivoire, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Paraguay, Portugal, and Venezuela. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final//ts2/newfiles/part_boo/xxviiboo/xvii_12.html (16 November 1999). 
4 UN Watercourses Convention (note 1), Preambular paragraph 5. 
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Achieving sustainable and peaceful management of the more than 500 
international  watercourses in various parts of the world is one of the major challenges in 
the immediate and long-term future.6 Since the turn of the twentieth century, increased 
competition for transboundary water resources has resulted in conflicts between States, 
many of which were resolved peacefully through international agreements.7 However, 
some longstanding problems remain8 and growing demand for diminishing water 
resources increases the possibility of new conflicts around the world. The  “water law” 
which developed in response to past transboundary disputes, emerged from decisions of 
domestic and international courts or tribunals and from international agreements.9 In the 
domestic legal system, the principle of “equitable apportionment” evolved as the primary 
rule that defined and balanced the competing claims of subnational actors.10 At the 
international level, the principle of “reasonable and equitable utilisation” crystallised as a 
rule of customary international law derived, in part, from national (inter-State) and 
international judicial practice, and supported by treaty law.11 Consistent with the doctrine 
                                               
6 Report of the Secretary-General, Commission on Sustainable Development, Comprehensive assessment 
of the freshwater resources of the world, UN Doc. E/CN.17/1997/9, 4 February 1997 < 
gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/esc/cn17/1997/off/97--9.EN >; See the World Water vision < 
http://www.watervision.org/ >; H.L.F Saeijs and J.M. van Berkel, The Global Water Crisis: The Major 
Issue of the Twenty-first Century, A Growing and Explosive Problem, in: E.H.P. Brans, E. J. de Haan, A. 
Nollkaemper and J. Rinzema (eds.), The Scarcity of Water: Emerging Legal and Policy Responses, 1997, 3. 
7P. Wouters, Rivers of the World, Fundamental Principles of the Law of International 
Watercourses, 2000, forthcoming. See also A.T. Wolf, Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart 
of international water conflict, Natural Resources Forum, vol. 23, 1999, 3. 
8 For example, the 10 riparian States to the Nile have yet to reach a basin-wide agreement.   
9 U.S. Supreme Court decisions (note 10), and the following decisions: Württemberg and Prussia v. Baden 
(18 June 1927), 4 ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, 1927-1928, 128-
133; 116 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 1927, 18-45. Société énergie électrique du 
littoral méditerranéen v. Compagnia imprese elettriche liguri (1939), 9 ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, 1938-1940, 120-123; 91 Giurisprudenza Italiana 1939-I, 518; 64 Foro 
Italiano 1939-I, 1036;and discussion on these decisions in Wouters (note 7), chapter 2.  
10 The US Supreme Court first applied equitable apportionment in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), 
and until recently has applied this doctrine in interstate cases in a consistent fashion, refusing to apply State 
laws founded on the doctrines of prior appropriation (Western United States) or of riparian rights (Eastern 
United States). See also the early cases Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 208; 206 U.S. 46; Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336; Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494; 
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496; Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367; 281 U.S. 179. For a critical 
summary of these see  X. Fuentes, The Criteria for the Equitable Utilization of International Rivers, in: 
British Year Book of International Law, 1996, 337; see also C. Bourne, The Right to Utilise the Waters of 
International Rivers, in: P. Wouters (ed.), International Water law: Selected Writings of Professor Charles 
B. Bourne, 1997, 25. 
11 L. Caflisch, The Law of International Waterways and Its Sources, in: R. St. J.Macdonald (ed.), Essays in 
Honour of Wang Tieya,1993, 115, 124. See Trail Smelter arbitral award, 3 RIAA 1938, 1911-1937 (initial 
decision, 16 April 1938); 1938-1981 (final decision, 11 March 1941); also in 9 ANNUAL DIGEST OF 
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of “limited territorial sovereignty”,12 this principle arose in the context of disputes over 
transboundary waters and it continues to govern the legitimacy of State activities in this 
field.13  
 In 1970, the United Nations (UN) responded to the need for clearer rules 
governing transboundary waters by requesting the International Law Commission (ILC) 
to codify and progressively develop the rules applicable to the development and 
management of international watercourses.14 For close to three decades, the ILC wrestled 
with the complex legal issues related to this topic.15 This work formed finally the 
foundation for the UN Watercourses Convention.  
 A broader global environmental agenda emerged in the 1970s, appearing most 
prominently at the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference.16 The UN pursued its concern over 
transboundary water issues at the 1977 Mar del Plata Conference, where the Action Plan 
adopted by the participants contain 11 resolutions and 102 recommendations.17 However, 
                                                                                                                                            
Corfu Channel case, 1949 ICJ 4 (Judgement, merits, 9 April 1949); Lac Lanoux arbitral award, 12 RIAA 
1957, 281-317 (Award, 16 November 1957); 24 ILR 1957, 101; reprinted in 62 RGDIP 1958, 79; 
Diversion of Water from the Meuse case, (Netherlands v. Belgium), 1937, PCIJ (Ser. A/B) No. 70; the 
Helmand River Delta arbitration (19 August 1872); the San Juan River arbitration (22 March 1888); the 
Kushk River case (August/September 1893) all discussed in UN Report of the Secretary-General, Legal 
Problems Relating to the Utilisation and Use of International Rivers, 1963 UN Doc. A/5409, vol. III, 496. 
12 Wouters (note 7), chapter 2; also J. Lipper, Equitable Utilisation, in: A.H. Garretson, et. al. (eds.), The 
Law of International Drainage Basins, 1967, 15; and S. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred 
Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, Natural Resources Journal, vol. 36, 1996, 725. 
13 H.A. Smith, The Economic Uses of International Rivers,1931. 
14 GA  Res. 2669 (XXV) 1970. 
15 P. Wouters (ed.), International Water Law: Codification and Progressive Development, Volume I: the 
Work of the UN International Law Commission; Volume II: Reports of the Special Rapportuers to the UN 
International Law Commission (2000, forthcoming) 
16 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr.1 (1972), reprinted at 11 ILM 1416. 
17 Report of the UN Water Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 1977, UN Doc. 
E/CONF.70/29. The Recommendations were subdivided into eight parts: “Assessment of Water 
Resources; Water Use and Efficiency; Environment, Health and Pollution Control; Policy, 
Planning and Management; Natural Hazards; Public Information, Education, Training and 
Research; Regional Cooperation; International Cooperation” and one Annex, “Specific Regional 
Recommendations”. Only 10 of the 11 Resolutions were adopted by consensus; the one dealing 
with agriculture was adopted by 52 votes for with 17 against and 22 abstaining. Each of the 102 
recommendations, except those dealing with regional cooperation were adopted without a vote. 
Of relevance to this paper, the recommendation concerning development of shared water 
resources was adopted by a vote of 29 for, 13 against, and 48 abstentions. The representatives 
of Israel, Nepal, Romania and Turkey requested their statements relating to international 
cooperation (Recommendation H) be recorded in the Report. For a criticism on the lack of follow-
up to Mar del Plata, see Stockholm Water Institute, Mar del Plata, 20 year anniversary seminar: 
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since then, “water” has become subsumed by the “environment”, loosing its relatively 
distinctive status as a separate area of global concern. Twenty years following the 
Stockholm Declaration, the “environment” has dominated the global discourse, as was 
demonstrated clearly by the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development.18 
At that meeting, transboundary water resources were dealt with as only one component of 
Agenda 21. Surprisingly, some of the recommendations contained in Chapter 18 (which 
deals with water issues) of that document19 had been weakened, if compared with the 
Stockholm Declaration adopted two decades earlier.20  
 Now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it appears that “water” is once again 
at the forefront of the international agenda, as a concern in its own right, having been 
invigorated by the World Water Vision process. A Ministerial conference in the Hague in 
March 2000 is to provide the springboard for an international Action Plan designed to 
address the forecasted crisis over the world’s water resources.21 What role will 
international water law, and, the UN Watercourses Convention, in particular, play in the 
new global response to managing increasingly scarce transboundary waters?  
 
                                               
18 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 
(1992), reprinted at 31 ILM 876; Agenda 21,16 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992). 
19 The Dublin Principles were the basis for Agenda 21, Chapter 18. Chapter 18, “Protection of the Quality 
and Supply of Freshwater Resources: Application of Integrated Approaches to the Development, 
Management and Use of Water Resources”, UNCED Report, Annex II, Agenda 21, 7 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 14, and Vol. II, 167-206, reprinted at < 
http://www.igc.apc.org/habitat/agenda21/ch-18.html >.  See The Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development,  
< http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/water/html/dublin_statement.htm >. 
20 For example, Agenda 21, id., paragraph 18.4 provides, “Transboundary water resources and their use are 
of great importance to riparian States. In this connection, cooperation among those States may be desirable 
in conformity with existing agreements and / or other arrangements, taking into account the interests of all 
riparian States concerned.” [emphasis added]. 
21See the World Water vision (note 6); also the Framework for Action of the Global water Partnership  
< http://www.hrwallingford.co.uk/projects/gwp.fau/ffa.html >, and “Building the Frameworks for Action” 
(July 1999), at <http://www.hrwallingford.co.uk/projects/gwp.fau/documents/building.pdf>;  
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2. International Conflicts Over Water 
The massive increase in dispute proneness projected for the not so distant 
future motivates a call for . . . guidelines for how water might be shared, 
and how to act in situations with opposing interests between beneficiaries 
as opposed to victims of particular land use and / or water projects, and 
between present as opposed to future generations.22 
 Water scarcity is a serious threat to regional stability and peace.23 Despite the 
developments of international law in the field, including the substantial treaty practice 
that has developed over the last century -- in fact, the first recorded treaty resolved a 
conflict over water24 -- disputes over water persist world-wide.25 Many of the most 
difficult cases involve upstream / downstream controversies, but competition over scarce 
resources raises complex issues for all users.26 The next part provides a brief survey of 
only some of the current international water contests, which are forecasted to occur all 
over the world.27  
 
                                               
22 M. Falkenmark, Water Scarcity -- Challenges for the Future, in: E.H.P. Brans, et. al. (note 6), 39. 
23 “The sharing of water among regions and states sooner or later produces conflicts. . . . According to the 
United Nations, some 3000 basins are the scenes of current conflicts”, T. Swartzberg, The World’s 
Freshwater Supplies: The Crunch is Here, International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1997, 13.  See 
statistics in World Water Council, “The International Water Policy Think Tank” (1999), on file with the 
author, 7. See http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/; also P. Gleick, Water in Crisis: A Guide to the World’s 
Fresh Water Resources,1993; P. Gleick, The World’s Water: The Biennial Report on Freshwater 
Resources,1998, <http://www.worldwater.org/ > and H.L.F Saeijs, et al.(note 6), 3. 
24 S. McCaffrey, Water Scarcity: Institutional and Legal Responses, in: E.H.P. Brans (note 6), 43. 
McCaffrey refers to the dispute in 3100 B.C. between the Mesopotamian city-states of Lagash and Umma. 
The treaty (the 'Stela of the Vultures' found today in the Louvre) resolved the conflict by providing for the 
diversion of the Euphrates waters into a shared boundary canal. Unfortunately, the agreement did not 
prevent future conflicts over water. 
25 Wolf (note 7). 
26 See, for example, the range of upstream / downstream problems encountered in this variety of basins: M. 
Banskota, Upstream Perspectives on River Basin Management in the Himalayas; R.W. Johnson, The 
Colorado River. History and Contemporary Issues of a Complex System; L. Kardoss, Management of 
International River Basins. The Case of the Danube River; W. Li, Basin Management of the Yellow River; 
T. Okazumi, River Basin Management in Tsurumi River, Japan; R. Gaal Vadas, The São Francisco River 
Basin; A. Carmo Vaz, Problems in the Management of International River Basins – The Case of the 
Incomati; papers delivered at the International Workshop on River Basin Management: Best Management, 
The Hague, 27-29 October 1999) (on file with author). 
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In the Middle East, Israel and the Palestinians continue to negotiate their 
respective rights and obligations concerning their shared waters.28 Allocation of the uses 
of the limited waters of the Jordan River, shared by Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan, are 
of particular concern to the downstream States, Israel and Jordan, who now experience 
problems in implementing the water-related provisions of their Treaty of Peace.29 In the 
same region, Turkey’s development of the upstream parts of the Tigris and Euphrates 
basins, primarily for the purposes of hydroelectric power production and irrigation, has 
resulted in a serious controversy with Syria and Iraq, especially during the filling of 
Turkey’s Ataturk Dam.30  
 In Asia, China has plans to build dams on the upper reaches of the Mekong, 
which is regulated only in its lower part by a recent agreement concluded between 
                                               
28 J. Dempsey, “Equitable” division of water a vexed issue, Financial Times, 9 November 1999, 
15. A key question in the negotiations is what constitutes an “equitable use” by each side. The 
existing distribution of uses favours the Israelis, with the Palestinians consuming, on average, 
one-third less than their neighbours. The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles 
proposed the joint management and “equitable utilisation of joint water resources”; see Israeli-
Palestinian Liberation Organisation Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-government 
Arrangements, 13 September 1993, 32 ILM 1525. See J. W. Dellapenna, Designing the Legal 
Structures of Water Management Needed to Fulfil the Israeli Declaration of Principles, in: The 
Palestine Yearbook of International Law, vol. VII, 1992-94, 63; E. Benvenisti, The Israeli-
Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A Framework for Future Settlement, European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 4, 1993, 543. In the 1995 Oslo agreement, Israel “recognises the 
Palestinian water rights in the West Bank; I. Scobbie, H2O After Oslo II: Legal Aspects of Water in 
the Occupied Territories, in: The Palestine Yearbook of International Law, vol. VIII, 1994-95, 79; 
S. Elmusa, Dividing Common Water Resources According to International Water Law: The Case 
of the Palestinian-Israeli Waters, Natural Resources Journal, vol. 35, 1995, 226. 
29 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace, 26 October 1994, 34 ILM 43 (1995). See Articles 6 and 15 and Annexes II 
and IV; see also M.R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resources in the Jordan River Basin 
(1993); S. McCaffrey, Middle East Water Problems: The Jordan River, Brans, et al (note 6), 158; T. Allan, 
The Nile Basin: evolving approaches to Nile waters management, 1999; 
J. A. Allan, Israel and Water in the Framework of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1999; 
A.R. Turton, Precipitation, People, Pipelines and Power: Towards a 'Virtual Water' based Political Ecology 
Discourse, 1999, < http://www.soas.ac.uk/Geography/WaterIssues/OccasionalPapers/home.html >. 
30The Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP) “will eventually irrigate 8.5 million hectares, equal to 19 percent 
of Turkey’s cultivable area, and provide 22 percent of its hydroelectricity…it will include 22 dams on the 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries; more than 1,000 kilometres of irrigation canals, feeders 
and distribution networks; and 19 power stations.” P. Dougherty, Groundbreaking Water Projects, 
International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1997, 14. See also O. Bilen, Turkey and Water Issues in the 
Middle East (Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), 1997, 102-129. For other views, see J. Bulloch and A. 
Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East,1994; M. Lowi, Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of 
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Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.31  The most acute transboundary problems in 
Central Asia involve the Aral Sea basin where more than 20 million people in five basin 
States struggle to share the “shrinking and polluted” resource.32 The recent 
internationalisation of a number of rivers and lakes in Eastern Europe has increased the 
potential for transboundary disagreements over water in that part of the world. 33 Despite 
a long history of cooperation, the Danube has been the subject of a dispute between 
Hungary and Slovakia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and three years 
after the Court’s decision the parties have yet to reach agreement on finally resolving the 
outstanding issues.34 Another area of discord, in the region covered by European Union, 
relates to the proposed Water Framework Directive, which continues to be modified as 
contentious issues are addressed.35  
                                               
31 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 5 April 
1995, 34 ILM 864 (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam).The plan by Laos to develop and export 
hydroelectric power may be compromised as a result. Vietnam’s need for sufficient flow to meet its 
agricultural and other needs may not be met. Similar problems may occur in Cambodia and Thailand. J.W. 
Jacobs, Planning for change and sustainability in water development in Lao PDR and the Mekong River 
basin, Natural Resources Forum, vol. 20, 1996, 174. Myanmar and China participate as Observers in 
meetings of the Mekong Commission; see Mekong River Commission Secretariat, Mekong River 
Commission: A Briefing Note, presented at the International Workshop on River Basin Management: Best 
Management Practices (note 26). 
32Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share the Aral Sea basin waters 
resources, the fourth largest lake on earth which has shrunk by more than 70 percent since 1960. The 
waters are highly saline and polluted by fertilisers, pesticides, and petroleum residues. See International 
Rescue Effort to Save the Aral Sea, International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1997, 14. See also V. 
Dukhovny, and U. Ruziev, River Basin Management in the Aral Sea Basin, International Workshop on 
River Basin Management (note 26).. 
33 S. Vinogradov, Transboundary Water Resources in the Former Soviet Union: Between Conflict and 
Cooperation, Natural Resources Journal, vol. 36, 1996, 393.  
34 Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 ICJ, General List No. 
92, (Judgement of 25 September), 37 ILM 162, < http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihs_ijudgment_970925_frame.htm >; See C. Bourne, The Case 
Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project: An Important Milestone in International Water Law; A. 
Boyle, The Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case: New Law in Old Bottles; P. Canelas de Castro, The Judgement in 
the Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project: Positive Signs for the Evolution of International 
Water Law; S. Stec and G. Eckstein, Of Solemn Oaths and Obligations: The Environmental Impact of the 
ICJ’s Decision in the Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project; in: Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law, vol. 8, 1997. 
35 The European Union has played an instrumental role in setting standards for water quality standards. See 
P. Sands and R.G. Tarasofsky (eds.), Documents in European Community Environmental Law, 1995, 735 
et seq. For the European Union Proposal for a Council Directive Establishing A Framework for 
Community Action in the Field of Water Law Policy, see Amended proposal for a Council Directive 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, 20 May, 1998 Working 
document ENV/98/127 SN/3041/1/98 REV 1 OR.EN (26 May 1998), < 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/water/html/documents.htm#1 >. See also P. Jones, The European 
Communities Framework Directive in the Field of Water Policy: Too much, too little, or just enough? 1998 
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 Africa has an impressive record of treaty practice,36 but longstanding problems 
remain and even grow. One example involves allocation of the uses of the Blue Nile, 
where planned measures in Ethiopia may adversely affect the downstream uses in Egypt. 
37 In other parts of Africa, despite adopting model regional and basin agreements,38 
States continue to face conflicts of water use, ineffective institutional mechanisms and 
insufficient technical and economic capacity to manage their shared waters.39 
On the Indian subcontinent, India, Bangladesh and Nepal have yet to agree on a 
basin-wide agreement concerning the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin40 and even the bilateral 
agreements in the region have not been fully implemented.41 
  There are increasing transboundary water quality and quantity problems in both 
North42 and South America, despite a long history of cooperation and a large number of 
international water agreements. The waters of the Colorado shared by the USA and 
Mexico are over-appropriated43 and dams on the Columbia River are being removed in 
the lower reaches in response to the “green” lobby.44 In South America, the legacy of 
                                                                                                                                            
and possible impacts on the regulations of water in England, Wales and Germany, LLM dissertation, 1999 
(on file with author). 
36 C.O. Okidi, International Law and Water Scarcity in Africa, Brans, et al (note 6), 
166. 
37 Ethiopia plans to develop micro-dams to meet its needs; Egypt believes this development will adversely 
affect its uses downstream. The two Parties have exchanged diplomatic notes over the issue and the World 
Bank is involved in assisting them to seek an amicable solution. 
38 See, inter alia, Convention Establishing the Niger River Basin Authority, 21 November 1990 
and Protocol on the Development Fund of the Niger Basin, 21 November 1980; texts published 
by the Niger Basin Authority (on file with the author); Agreement on the Action Plan for the 
Environmentally Sound Management of the Common Zambezi River System, 28 May 1987, 27 
ILM 1112 (1988, entered into force upon signature); Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems < http://www.sadc.int/water.htm >.   
39 See DFID 5-country study report, on file with the author. See Carmo Vaz (note 26). 
40 B.G. Verghese, Learning to Say ‘Open Sesame’, in: D.J. Eaton (ed.), The Ganges-
Brahmaputra Basin: Water Resource Cooperation between Nepal, India and Bangladesh, 1992, 
99.  
41S. Salman and K. Uptrey, Hydro-politics in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the Makahali 
and the Ganges Treaties, Natural Resources Journal, vol. 39, 1999. 
42 P. Wouters, Theory and Practice in the Allocation of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses: Canada and the United States, A Case Study, Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law, vol. 30, 1992, 43. 
43 R. Johnson states that of the total 15 million acre feet (MAF) of the total Colorado flow available for 
allocation, more than 18 MAF has been allocated to date. Johnson (note 26). 
44 F. Schouten, Dam-breaking idea spawns fierce debate about fish, USA Today, 24 November 1999, 22A. 
“The issue rests on whether saving the fish is more important than the economic benefits the dams have 
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basin-wide watercourse agreements45 has been jeopardised by unilateral actions of some 
States and a general lack of coordinated basin-wide management, despite treaty 
commitments.46  
 
3. Evolution of International Water Law 
 International water law has evolved and crystallised through State practice and the 
codification and progressive development efforts undertaken by the UN47 and private 
institutions.48 The treaty practice in this area encompasses a broad range of instruments, 
from general agreements (which provide basic principles for water resource 
development)49 to specific “contractual” type legal and technical arrangements (which set 
forth detailed operational schemes).50 Regional cooperation agreements, sometimes 
                                                                                                                                            
advocates, anglers and Indian tribes – who passionately support dam removal as the key to restoring 
endangered salmon – against farmers, barge operators and others who rely on the river for shipping, 
irrigation and electricity”.  
45Inter alia, Treaty between Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam, and 
Venezuela for Amazonian Cooperation, 3 July 1978, 17 ILM  1045 (1978, entered into force 
August, 1980); Treaty on the River Plate Basin, 23 April 1969, 875 UNTS 11; 8 ILM 905 (1969, 
entered into force on 14 August 1970); Treaty between Argentina and Uruguay, 13 ILM 251 
(1974); Agreement between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay on Parana River Projects, 19 
October 1979, 19 ILM 615 (1980, entered into force on 19 October 1979).  
46 Wouters (note 7), chapter 12; and T. Lee, The Management of Shared Water Resources in Latin America, 
Natural Resources Journal, vol. 34, 1995, 541. However a recent project and regional economic agreement 
may be enhancing cooperation in the region. “Hidrovia”, is an ambitious plan to improve navigation on the 
Paraná and Paraguay rivers. It involves the five States of the Plate system - Bolivia, and the four Mercosur 
States, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Mercosur (Mercado Común del Cono Sur) is the 
Southern Cone Common Market established between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in March 
1991. See remarks by Uruguayan representative, Mrs. Flores, in Summary Record of the Sixth Committee 
on the Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Forty-fifth Session, UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.23, 3. 
47 The codification and progressive development of international law is undertaken by the 
International Law Commission. See Statute of the International Law Commission, < 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/statufra.htm  >. 
48 See the work of the Institut de droit international (notably, Resolution of 11 September 1961, 
Utilisation of Non-Maritime International Waters (except of Navigation), Annuaire de l’Institut de 
droit international, vol. 49-II, 1961, 381; and that of the International Law Association (notably, the 
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Report of the Fifty-Second 
Conference of the International Law Association, 14-20 August 1966, 1967, 484. 
49 Mekong Convention (note 31). 
50 Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 24 October 1986, < 
http://www.metsi.com/dwarf/treaty/treaty.html >; also at FAO Legislative Study, Treaties 
concerning the non-navigational uses of international watercourses: Africa, No. 61, 1997, 172. 
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supplemented by more specific protocols, include the SADC Convention with Water 
Protocol, 51 the UNECE Helsinki Convention52 with Water and Health Protocol.53 A 
specialised type of regional regulation, particular to Western Europe is accomplished 
through the EU Water Directives, including the soon to be adopted EU Water Framework 
Directive.54 
 Concluded under the auspices of the Economic Commission of Europe and 
adopted by 24 European countries and the European Union,55 the Helsinki Convention56 
provides one possible model for the regional regulation of transboundary waters. It deals 
with the prevention, control and reduction of transboundary impacts relating to 
international watercourses and lakes, with a strong emphasis on pollution-prevention. Its 
principal aims are the protection and ecologically sound and rational management and 
reasonable and equitable use of transboundary waters along with the conservation and 
restoration of ecosystems. In July 1997, the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to 
Convention adopted the Helsinki Declaration and a 3-year work plan.57 The Protocol on 
Water and Health, signed in London in June 1999, is the most recent result of this work. 
                                               
51 The Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), 17 August 1992, 32 ILM 116 (1993) < http://www.sadc.int/overview/treaty.htm >; and 
SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems (note 38). 
52 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 17 March 1992, 31 ILM 1312 (1992), and 
< http://www.unece.org/env/water/welcome.html  > (entered into force 6 October 1996). 
53 Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and Lakes, id., 17 June 1999, < www.who.dk/london99);See also 1998 UN ECE Convention 
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters; and 1991 UN/ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
< http://www.unece.org/. >.  
54 Water Framework Directive (note 35). 
55 Albania, Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the European Union have ratified the Convention 
(figures to November 1999). 
56 UN/ECE Helsinki Convention (note 52). 
57 UN/ECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, Report of the First Meeting, 12 Aug. 1997 (on file with the author). 
The Working Plan sets forth a series of programme areas including the establishment of joint bodies, 
providing assistance to countries with economies in transition, setting up a system of integrated 
management of water and related ecosystems, control of land-based pollution, and the prevention, control 
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Current projects include consideration of a compliance review procedure58 and enhanced 
public participation.59 The Helsinki Convention demonstrates how a range of problems 
related to transboundary water development and management can be addressed in a 
comprehensive and cooperative fashion within a framework instrument that provides the 
basis for the elaboration of more specific transboundary water agreements.60 A recent 
example of the latter is an agreement between Spain and Portugal, which is based on the 
principles of the Helsinki  Convention and takes into consideration the provisions of the 
draft EU Framework Directive.61 Should this model be applied universally? What role, if 
any, has the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention given the availability and effectiveness 
of other regulatory models such as the Helsinki Convention?  
 
 
                                               
58 UNECE and UNEP Report, “Geneva Strategy and Framework of Monitoring Compliance with 
Agreements on Transboundary Waters”, UN ECE Document MP. Water/2000/ December 1999 
(on file with the author). 
59 Id. 
60 Agreement on the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, 29 April 
1963, 994 UNTS 19 (entry into force 1 May 1965); and the Convention Between the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the European 
Economic Community Concerning the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, 3 December 
1976, 16 ILM 242 (1977, entry into force February 1, 1979); and the Convention Between the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the 
European Economic Community Concerning the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides,  3 
December 1976, 16 ILM 265 ( 197, entry into force July 5, 1985); and the Convention on the Protection of 
the Rhine, 22 January 1998, < http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/water/html/documents.htm#1 >. 
Convention concerning the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, 18 August 1948, 33 UNTS 181 
(1949); Convention Between Hungary and Yugoslavia Concerning the Construction and 
Operation of the Hydraulic Works of Bos/Gabcíkovo--Nagymaros, Budapest, 16 September 1977, 
1109 UNTS 236 (1978, entry into force 30 June 1978); Agreement Between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the European Community, on the one Hand, and the Republic of Austria, on the 
other, on Cooperation on Management of Water Resources in the Danube Basin, 1 December 
1987, Official Journal of the Eur. Comm., No. L 20, 1990, 20. Belgium (Brussels-Capital, Flanders 
Wallonia Regional Governments) – France, Netherlands, Agreement on the Protection of the 
Rivers Muese, 26 April 1994, 34 ILM 854 (1995); Belgium (Brussels-Capital, Flanders Wallonia 
Regional Governments) – France, Netherlands, Agreement on the Protection of the Rivers 
Scheldt, 26 April 1994, 34 ILM 855. 
61 A. Gonçalves Henriques, The Portuguese-Spanish Convention on Shared River Basins: A Framework for 
Cooperation on Protection of Waters and Sustainable Development, International Workshop on River Basin 
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4. The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention62 
4.1. Evolution 
 In May 1997, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Law 
relating to the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, an instrument 
originating from the work of the International Law Commission (ILC). The Commission 
was asked by the UN General Assembly to “take up the study of the law of international 
watercourses with a view to its progressive development and codification” in 1970.63 By 
1991, following consideration of thirteen reports prepared by five consecutive Special 
Rapporteurs,64 the ILC successfully completed a comprehensive set of draft articles and 
adopted these on First Reading.65 They were modified and adopted by the ILC on Second 
Reading in 1994.66 The UN General Assembly decided that this text should be 
considered by the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the UN, convened as a Working Group of 
the Whole, with a view to finalising it in the form of a multilateral treaty.67 
                                               
62 L. Caflisch, Regulation of the Uses of International Watercourses, 3; S. McCaffrey, The UN Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls, 17 in: S. 
M.A. Salman and L. Boisson de Chazournes (eds.), International Watercourses, Enhancing Cooperation and 
Managing Conflict, 1997, 17. See A. Tanzi and M. Arcari, The UN Convention on International 
Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing, 2000 (forthcoming). 
63 UN GA Res. 2669 (XXV) 1970.  
64 The five Special Rapporteurs delivered a total of 13 reports. Mr. Richard D. Kearney (1974-
1976, 1 report); Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel (1977-1981, 3 reports); Mr. Jens Evensen (1982-1984, 
2 reports); Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey (1985-1991, 7 reports); Mr. Robert Rosenstock (1992-1994, 
2 reports). See Wouters (note 15), the work of the ILC.  
65  Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of the 
ILC on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session (1991), UN GAOR, 49th Session, Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. 
A/49/10, 197. 
66 Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of the 
ILC on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session (1994), UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. 
A/49/10, 197. See C. Bourne, The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of 
International Watercourses: Principles and Planned Measures, in: Wouters (note 10), 83; M. Fitzmaurice, 
The Law of Non-navigational uses of International Watercourses – The International Law Commission 
completes its Draft, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 8, 1995, 361. 
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The Working Group of the Whole met for two two-week long sessions, in 
October 1996 and in March / April 1997. 68 The deliberations of the first session finished 
on a sour note, as the division of States’ positions on a number of important issues was so 
profound that there were doubts that a final text could be agreed upon. The second 
session, also replete with debate, nonetheless resulted in the adoption of a final text. The 
process, however, involved the remarkable precedent of voting on the most contentious 
issues.  
The four major questions at the heart of the Working Group’s deliberations were: 
(1) what should be the relationship between the Convention and existing and future 
water-related agreements;  (2) what should be the relationship between the principle of 
equitable utilisation, embodied in Article 5, and the no-harm rule, expressed in Article 7; 
(3) in the context of watercourses management, what rules should govern environmental 
protection; and (4) what dispute settlement mechanisms should be used in the case of 
possible disputes between the Parties. A summary of the results reached on each of these 
issues is presented next. 
The issue regarding the relationship between the Watercourses Convention and 
existing and future agreements, which was raised in the Working Group69, had not been 
addressed in the ILC’s draft.70 Some States (such as Portugal and Ethiopia) argued that 
certain provisions of the Convention had to be considered as rules of jus cogens and as 
such could not be derogated frp, by any other norm of international law, including treaty 
provisions. Other States (Egypt, France and Switzerland) insisted that existing treaties 
should be left unaffected by the new Convention.71 Not surprisingly, State positions 
tended to reflect their particular situations.72  
                                               
68 See L. Caflisch, La Convention du 21 Mai 1997 sur l’utilisation des cours d’eau internationaux à 
des fins autres que la navigation, XLIII Annuaire Français de droit international 1997, 1; see also 
Wouters (note 15).  
 
69 Caflisch, id., 20. 
70 Caflisch (note 62), 9. “The issues had not been covered at all by the Draft Articles, presumably 
because the ILC had assumed as a matter of course that existing agreements would survive 
without change unless the Parties were to decide to abrogate or amend them in light of the new 
Convention”,  
71 Id. 
72 For example, Ethiopia wanted Article 3 to require existing watercourse agreements be 
harmonised with the Convention; see Verbatim record, 99th plenary meeting, U.N. General 
Assembly, 21 May 1997, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.99, at 9-10, cited in McCaffrey, Prospects and 
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The  text of Article 3 was revised by the Working Group and put to a vote before 
being adopted by 36 votes for, with 3 against (Egypt, France, Turkey) and 21 
abstentions.73 The provision preserves the validity of existing watercourse agreements, 
but adds that Parties  “may, where necessary, consider harmonising such agreements with 
the basic principles of the ... Convention”.74 This, together with the solid international 
endorsement of the Convention,75 supports the view that watercourse States will consider 
the provisions of the Convention in the interpretation of their existing agreements.76  
 A similar result occurred with respect to the issue of future agreements.77 Under 
Article 3(3) of the Convention, adopted unchanged from the Commission’s draft, States 
“may enter” into new agreements, “which apply and adjust the provisions of the present 
Convention to the characteristics and uses” of the watercourse involved. Thus, States 
took the view that the norms contained in the document were not rules of jus cogens nor 
“multilateral treaty rules, which may not be derogated from by agreements between some 
of the Parties to it”.78 The result of the discussions led the Working Group to conclude 
that watercourse States should be free to negotiate their own agreements regarding 
transboundary watercourses, but are encouraged to consider the rules contained in the 
Convention.79 Some insight into the possible interpretation of Article 3 is provided by the 
Statements of Understanding adopted by the Working Group.80 
                                               
73 UN Doc. A/C.6/51/NUW/L.4/AD1; Sixth Committee # 62, 4 April 1997. 
74 UN Watercourses Convention, (note 1), Article 3(1) and 3(2). 
75 GA Res. 49/52 (note 67). 
76 This is supported by Statements of Understanding on Article 3 which provide:  “The present 
Convention will serve as a guideline for future watercourse agreements and, once such 
agreements are concluded, it will not alter the rights and obligations provided therein, unless such 
agreements provide otherwise”. 
77 For more complete discussion of the issues, see Caflisch (note 68), 22 et seq. 
78 Caflisch (note 62), 11. 
79 UN Watercourses Convention (note 1), Article 3(1) provides: In the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, nothing in the present Convention shall affect the rights and obligations of a watercourse State 
arising from agreements in force for it on the date on which it became a party to the present Convention. 
Article 3(2): Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph 1, parties to agreements referred to in paragraph 1 
may, where necessary, consider harmonising such agreements with the basic principles of the present 
Convention [emphasis added]. Article 3(3): Watercourse States may enter into one or more agreements, 
hereinafter referred to as  ‘watercourse agreements’, which apply and adjust the provisions of the present 
Convention to the characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse or part thereof.” 
80 The Statement of Understanding provides, inter alia, “. . . What is to be avoided are localised 
agreements, or agreements concerning a particular project, programme or use, which have a 
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 Article 4 (1) of the ILC’s draft, which gives each watercourse State a right to 
participate in the negotiation of an agreement involving the entire basin, was not revised 
by the Working Group and is included in the UN Watercourses Convention. However, 
some States were preoccupied with the nature and extent of rights to participate in partial 
agreements, i.e. those between some States of the watercourse relating to only parts of it.   
The issue arising from the ILC’s draft was whether States not party to a partial agreement 
should be legally entitled to accede to it. A number of upstream States rejected such a 
possibility.81 In the end, the Working Group modified the Commission’s draft to make it 
clear that only a watercourse State “whose use of an international watercourse may be 
affected to a significant extent” (emphasis added) by the implementation of such planned 
measures “is entitled to participate in consultations on such an agreement and, where 
appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good faith with a view to becoming a Party 
thereto, to the extent that its use is thereby affected".82 Whether this provision has 
eliminated or reduced the uncertainty concerning the legal grounds for the rights in 
question is yet to be seen. 83 International practice does not reveal many examples where 
a State wishing to participate in a particular watercourse agreement would be denied such 
a request. On the contrary, there are cases where States, particularly those situated 
upstream, were reluctant to be bound by such partial agreements, perhaps out of fear of 
limiting the freedom of their own activities on the watercourse.84  
 
                                               
81 Caflisch (note 62), 11. 
82 UN Watercourses Convention (note 1), Article 4(2). 
83 Caflisch (note 62), 12. The problem is whether the third watercourse State is not limited in its rights to 
participate fully by the words "where appropriate" and "to the extent that its use is thereby affected", both 
of which appear to favour the original Parties to the agreement. 
84 This appears to be the case on the Mekong, where China and Myanmar have resisted becoming Parties to 
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The most hotly contested issue in the Working Group involved the meaning and 
the relationship between the provisions of Articles 5 and 7 of the ILC Draft, the 
principles of reasonable and equitable use and no significant harm.  The focus of the 
debate was, in particular, on which of these two norms should prevail where available 
water resources are not sufficient to meet the needs of riparian States? The evolution of 
these norms during the long study by the Commission provided more than sufficient 
background for this debate. In the 1991 ILC Draft Articles, the “no-appreciable harm” 
(Article 7)  had been presented as the cornerstone provision of the entire document.85 
Under that rule, a new or increased use that might cause “appreciable harm” to an 
existing use would not be permitted, regardless of whether it might qualify as an 
equitable and reasonable use in accordance with Articles 5 and 6.86  
 
                                               
85 Article 7 in the ILC 1991 Draft Articles, provided: “Watercourse States shall utilise an international 
watercourse in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States”.  The Commentary 
to the provision explained that “a watercourse State’s right to utilise an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner has its limit in the duty . . . not to cause appreciable harm. . .In other 
words, -- prima facie, at least – utilisation of an international watercourse is not equitable if it causes other 
watercourse States appreciable harm”. This formula deviated from the one proposed by Schwebel, the 
Special Rapporteur that introduced these concepts. See Special Rapporteur S. Schwebel, Third Report on 
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN Doc. A/CN.4/320, in: Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, vol. II, Part One, 1982, 65, 103. In his proposed Article 8, Schwebel 
subordinated the duty not to cause “appreciable” harm to the right of equitable utilisation. Special 
Rapporteur, J. Evensen, reversed the hierarchy proposed by Schwebel. See J. Evensen, First Report on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN Doc. A/CN.4/367, in: Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, vol. II, Part One, 1983, 155. Evensen’s successor, Special Rapporteur 
S. McCaffrey, following an extensive survey of State practice and doctrine, recommended that Evensen's 
"no-appreciable-harm" Article be redrafted in such a way as to bring it into conformity with  . . .  the 
principle of equitable utilisation . . .  “[T]he focus should be on the duty not to cause legal injury (by 
making a non-equitable use) rather than on the duty not to cause factual harm . . .  [I]n the context of 
watercourses, suffering even significant harm may not infringe the rights of the harmed State if the harm is 
within the limits allowed by an equitable utilisation.” McCaffrey provided three examples of how 
Evensen's Article 9 might be redrafted so as to achieve this end. See S. McCaffrey, Second Report on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN Doc. A/CN.4/399 and Add.1 and 2, 
in: Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, Part One, 1986, 87133 et seq. 
 
86 See Commentary to Article 7, 1991 Draft, in: Yearbook of the International Law Commission (note 65). 
Article 5 of the 1991 Draft provided: “Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilise an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.  In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal utilisation 
thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse. (2) Watercourse 
States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner.  Such participation includes both the right to utilise the watercourse and 
the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present articles”. See 
also Special Rapporteur McCaffrey’s explanation in support of the priority of the no-appreciable harm rule, 
S. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Some Recent Developments and Unanswered 
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This approach significantly differed from the one adopted by the International 
Law Association (ILA) in its substantial and comprehensive work on the rules governing 
international drainage basins.87 The ILA’s 1966 Helsinki Rules provide “Each basin State 
is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of 
the waters of an international drainage basin”.88 This position has been adhered to by the 
ILA in all of its post-Helsinki work on the law of water resources, most notably in the 
1982 Montreal Rules on Pollution,89 and the 1986 Seoul Complementary Rules.90 
 In response to serious criticisms,91 the ILC revised Draft Article 7 in 1994.92 The 
changes made related to the threshold of acceptable harm, the nature of the obligation to 
                                               
 
87 C. Bourne (note 66). See also S. Bogdanovic, The Work of the International Law Association 
and the Institut de Droit International, 2000 (forthcoming). 
 
88 ILA Report, Helsinki Rules (note 48), 447. 
 
89 International Law Association, Committee on International Water Resources, Report of the 
Montreal Conference, Rules on Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin, 1982, 535 et 
seq., FAO No. 65, 1998, 314. Article 1 of the Montreal Rules begins, “Consistent with the Helsinki 
Rules on the equitable utilisation of the waters of an international drainage basin, States shall 
ensure that activities conducted within their territory or under their control conform with the 
principles set forth in these Articles concerning water pollution in an international drainage basin”.  
 
90 International Law Association, Committee on International Water Resources, Report of the 
Seoul Conference, Complimentary Rules Applicable to International Water Resources, 1986, 272 
et seq., FAO No. 65, 1998, 319. Article 1 of the Seoul Rules provide, “A basin State shall refrain 
from and prevent acts or omissions within its territory that will cause substantial injury to any co-
basin State, provided that the application of the principle of equitable utilisation as set forth in 
Article IV of the Helsinki Rules does not justify an exception in a particular case. Such an 
exception shall be determined in accordance with Article V of the Helsinki Rules”. The primacy of 
the principle of equitable utilisation is reinforced in the Commentary to that provision.  
 
91 Of the seventeen States that responded to the Secretary-General's call for comments and observations, 
Germany, Greece, the Nordic Countries, Syria, Turkey, the UK, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Chad, 
Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands commented on Articles 5 and 7 of the 1991 ILC Draft. Iraq and 
Spain made comments relating to the factors to be considered under Article 6, proposing that existing uses 
and special dependency be included in that provision. Most of the States that commented on the normative 
content of Article 7 considered that the term "appreciable" harm should be replaced by another term, such 
as “significant” or “perceptible”. On the relationship between Articles 5 and 7, Germany and the UK 
supported the ILC's approach, while Greece, the Nordic countries, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Poland, 
and the Netherlands wanted changes to the Draft to the effect that the principle of equitable utilisation 
would be the governing rule -- except in cases involving pollution harm. Turkey called for more "balance" 
in the Draft, so that the rights of upstream States would be better protected. Syria wanted to ensure that 
sanitary uses were safeguarded and that joint management of the watercourse system was required. 
Hungary urged the Commission to adopt a general rule of prevention to complement a general no-harm 
approach to watercourse development. See Comments and Observations Received from States, UN Doc. 
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be observed, and the relationship between Articles 5 and 7. Under the revised Article 7,93 
States were required to “exercise due diligence to utilise an international watercourse in 
such a way as not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States”. This altered 
both the threshold of permissible harm (increasing it from ‘appreciable’ to ‘significant’) 
and the nature of the obligation to be observed (from one of result, ‘no appreciable harm’, 
to an obligation of behaviour, ‘due diligence’).  Thus, significant harm resulting from a 
watercourse activities conducted with due diligence might not be construed as 
constituting a breach of international law. Instead, the harm-causing State is simply 
obliged to consult with the injured State on the extent to which the use is equitable and 
reasonable and the possibility of  mitigation and compensation.94 Despite these changes, 
however, the provision could still be interpreted as endorsing the “no-significant harm” 
rule as the primary obligation.95 
 The modified Article 7 proved unacceptable to some States.96 The Working 
Group again revised the provision, and the following version was finally adopted as 
Article 7 of the UN Watercourses Convention: 
                                                                                                                                            
92 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, UN Doc. 
A/49/10.  
 
93 1994 ILC Draft Articles (note 66), Art. 7. Article 7 of the 1994 ILC Draft Articles read: “1. 
Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilise an international watercourse in such a 
way as not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States.  2. Where, despite the exercise 
of due diligence, significant harm is caused to another watercourse State, the State whose use 
causes the harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, consult with the State suffering 
harm over: (a) the extent to which such use is equitable and reasonable taking into account the 
factors listed in article 6; (b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilisation, designed to 
eliminate or mitigate any such harm caused, and, where appropriate, the question of 
compensation”. 
94 UN International Watercourses Convention (note 1), Article 7(2). 
 
95 P. Wouters, An Assessment of the Recent Developments in International Watercourse Law 
through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation, Natural Resources Journal 
vol. 36, 1996, 417. 
96 Only eleven States responded before the July deadline, including  Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, 
Guatemala, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the USA, Venezuela and Switzerland. Later 
submissions were made by Italy, Niger, and the Sudan. Of these, the majority had something to 
say about Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the ILC’s 1994 Draft. See Report of the Secretary General, 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN Doc. 
A/51/275 and Add.1, Add.2, and Add. 3.  See also Summary Records of Meetings of the Sixth 
Committee, including inter alia, UN Docs. A/C.6/51/SR.15, A/C.6/51/SR.16, A/C.6/51/SR.17; 
A/C.6/49/SR.17, A/C.6/49/SR.19, A/C.6/49/SR.22, A/C.6/48/SR.24, A/C.6/46/SR.26, 
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Article 7 Obligation not to cause significant harm 
(1) Watercourse States shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm 
to other watercourse States. 
(2) Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, 
the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of an agreement to 
such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of 
articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate 
such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation. 
Articles 597 and 6,98 changed slightly, and the revised Article 7 were put forward 
together for voting in the Working Group.  This “package” was adopted by 38 States for, 
4 against (China, France, Tanzania and Turkey), and 22 abstaining.99  
 The third major issue debated in the Working Group was the place of rules on 
environmental protection. The discussion focused mostly on the extent to which rules 
relevant to this topic should be reflected as general principles of the Convention. Some 
States, including Finland,100 the Netherlands,101 and Portugal,102 suggested that the 
principle of sustainable use should be the overarching rule of the entire project, with 
appropriate references to the precautionary principle and environmental protection.103 In 
                                               
 
97 The changes to Article 5 (Equitable and reasonable utilisation and participation) are highlighted: “(1). 
Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilise an international watercourse in an equitable 
and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by 
watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof and benefits 
therefrom taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned consistent with adequate 
protection of the watercourse.” 
 
98 The following subparagraph was added to the ILC’s Draft Article 6, (Factors relevant to equitable and 
reasonable utilisation): “(3). The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable share, all 
relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole”. 
 
99 UN Doc. A/C.6/51/NUW/L.4/AD1 (note 73). 
 
100 UN Doc.A/C.6/51/SR.15, 2 and 9. 
 
101 UN Doc.A/C.6/51/SR.15, 2 and 11. 
 
102 UN Doc.A/C.6/51/SR.15, 2, 6, 7 and 10. 
 
103 Other States that supported this approach included Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, 
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the end, however, only small changes were made to the ILC’s draft, including a reference 
in Article 5 to  “sustainable utilisation” and a minor addition to Article 6 that supports 
weighing all relevant factors, including environmental concerns, in the overall 
determination of a reasonable and equitable use.104  
 Despite the debate over the role of environmental protection and pollution 
protection, Part IV of the Convention is almost identical to the Commission’s Draft 
Articles, apart from some refinements in Articles 21 and 23 aimed at increasing co-
operation between watercourse States. Article 21 requires States to “individually, and, 
where appropriate, jointly, prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international 
watercourse that may cause significant harm to other watercourse States or to their 
environment, including harm to human health or safety, to the use of the waters for any 
beneficial purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse”.105 This provision, as 
well as those found throughout the Convention, must be read in accordance with the 
General Principles set forth in Part II. Thus, Article 5 determines the legal entitlement for 
all uses, and Article 7 prescribes the standard for a State’s behaviour in undertaking 
activities related to those uses. Article 21 is to be interpreted in that context, with the 
understanding that pollution should be reduced and prevented. However, the level of 
pollution harm permitted in a particular case must be determined in accordance with the 
principle of equitable utilisation.106 
 Finally, dealing with the issue of dispute settlement,107 States were divided on 
two issues, whether it was suitable for a framework agreement to contain such 
mechanisms, and if so, the extent to which these should be compulsory.108 While one 
group of States was in favour of compulsory and binding dispute settlement 
                                               
104 Note 98, for the text of Article 6 revised by the Working Group. 
105 UN International Watercourses Draft, Art. 21(2). 
106 For an indication of how this is accomplished, see the Commentary to Articles IV and V of the 
ILA’s Helsinki Rules, in: A.H. Garretson et. al, The Law of International Drainage Basins, 1967, 
779, 784 e seq., and the Commentary to Article 1 of the ILA’s Montreal Rules on Pollution.  
 
107 The ILC’s provision on dispute settlement, Article 33, had been adopted quickly, without a lengthy 
discussion, based on Special Rapporteur Rosenstock’s Second Report. He had been asked to report on this 
issue, since the Commission had failed to address it when presented by Special Rapporteur McCaffrey in 
his detailed Sixth Report. See S. McCaffrey, Sixth Report, Annex II, in: Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission vol. II, Part One, 1990, 75, AN/CN.4/427, with explanatory notes at 66-75. That report built 
on Schwebel, Third Report (Draft Art. 16) and Evensen, First Report (Draft Articles 31-38). McCaffrey 
recommended fact-finding (through joint organisation established by the States or by a commission of 
inquiry to be established by the parties); consultations and negotiations, conciliation, and binding 
arbitration. See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-Second 
Session, in: Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II Part Two, 1990, 47, para. 253; See also 
Topical Summary of the Discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its Forty-
Eighth Session prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/CN.4/457, 88-89. 
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mechanisms,109 others considered such an approach too rigid and unsuitable for a 
framework convention110 and argued that such matters should be left to the discretion of 
the States concerned.111 Some States supported the provision included in the ILC’s 
Draft.112  
 In its final form, Article 33 reflects a compromise of the opposing positions. 
Apart from recommending the traditional means of dispute resolution, it provides for 
compulsory fact-finding, 113 which, in its application under the Convention, appears 
similar to a compulsory conciliation procedure.114 Article 33 did not win the unanimous 
support of States in the Working Group: only thirty-three States voted in favour of the 
provision, five voted against it (including four persistent objectors to its compulsory 
mechanism: China, France, India and Turkey), and twenty-five States abstained.115 This 
                                               
   
 109 Switzerland challenged the inconsistencies in the scheme set forth in the Commission’s 1994 Draft; see 
remarks by the Swiss representative in the 1994 Summary Record of the Sixth Committee on the Report of 
the ILC on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.23, at 3. Switzerland argued Article 
33 failed to provide a mechanism for disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the treaty. 
Another shortcoming was the non-binding nature of the Fact-Finding Commission; see UN Doc. 
A/C.6/51/SR.20, 10. The Swiss proposal provided for consultations and negotiations at the first stage; 
where this did not occur within a fixed period of time, conciliation by unilateral initiative; and arbitration or 
an action before the ICJ, at the third stage. This appears to be close to the formula finally adopted by the 
Working Group. See also, inter alia, views of Finland, UN Doc. A/51/275, 67, Pakistan, Syria and 
Hungary, UN Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.20, 11 and UN Doc. A/51/275/Add.3, 12. 
  110 UN Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.20. 
  111 UN Doc. A/51/275, 68.  
   112 The USA and Venezuela thought the provision should be left as proposed by the Commission; UN 
Doc. A/51/275, 69. 
113 UN International Watercourses Convention (note 1) Article 33(1). In the first instance, Parties 
“in the absence of an applicable agreement … shall seek a settlement of the dispute by peaceful 
means”. Failure to reach agreement after 6 months by negotiation or other peaceful means, 
entitles any Party to submit the dispute to “impartial fact-finding”. Parties may also agree to 
submit their disputes to the ICJ or having it resolved by arbitration in accordance with the 
Convention. 
114 Id., Article 33(8) provides, “The Commission shall adopt its report by a majority vote, unless it 
is a single-member Commission, and shall submit that report to the Parties concerned setting 
forth its findings and the reasons therefor and such recommendation as it deems appropriate for 
an equitable solution of the dispute, which the Parties concerned shall consider in good faith.” 
 
115 UN Doc. A/C.6/51/NUW/L.3/AD1. States voting for: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, 
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, 
Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, UK, USA, Vietnam; Against: China, Colombia, France, India, 
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closely divided voting (33 States for, 29 against or abstaining) highlights the extent of the 
discord among States on this delicate issue.116 
  The voting record does not readily reveal the reasoning of States.117 For example, 
some States voted against Article 33 because it contained “too much” dispute settlement 
mechanisms, notably the positions of China and India.118 Other States, such as Pakistan, 
Switzerland and Syria were unhappy with Article 33 because it was not strong enough.119 
Turkey took the position that it was unsuitable for a framework instrument to contain any 
provisions relating to dispute settlement.120 
The final text of the Convention was adopted by the Working Group of the Whole 
by a vote of 42 States for, 3 against and 18 abstentions.121 Following is a summary of the 
voting record.122  
                                                                                                                                            
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Mali, Pakistan, Rwanda, Slovakia, Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, 
Macedonia, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zimbabwe; 130 States did not vote.   
116 Caflisch (note 68), 45, comments, “On voit mal comment ce instrument pourrait devenir 
pleinement effectif sans un système de règlement contraignant; et c’est d’un mécanisme 
juridictionnel qu’il devrait s’agir puisque les différends en question porteront sur l’interprétation de 
règles de droit. . . . La controverse en cette matière a démontré, enfin, que les dissensions en 
matière de règlement pacifique n’ont nullement cessé avec la fin la guerre froide; néanmoins, 
l’issue des négociations aurait peut-être été plus favorable si la CDI s’était engagée sur ce point.” 
 
117 UN Doc. A/C.6/51/NUW/L.3/ADI. 
 
118 According to India, “Any procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes should leave the 
procedure to the Parties. Any mandatory third-party dispute settlement procedure was 
inappropriate and should not be included in a framework convention”. China “could not support 
provisions on the mandatory settlement of disputes which went against the principles set out in 
the UN Charter”. Turkey, Israel and Rwanda expressed similar views. See UNGA Press Release 
GA/9248, 21 May 1997. 
 
119 See UNGA Press Release, 21 May 1997.  
120 See UNGA Press Release GA/9248, 21 May 1997. 
 
 
121  UN Doc. A/51/869. 
















Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, 
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark,  Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Holy See, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Jordan, 
Liechtenstein,  Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Romania, South 
Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, 
Tunisia, UK, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Zimbabwe 
 






India, Israel, Japan, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Mali, Pakistan, 
Russia,  Rwanda, 
Slovakia, Spain, 
Tanzania 
(*130 States did not 
vote) 
 
The States that voted for the Convention included a mixture of upstream, 
downstream and “mid-stream” (i.e. upstream and downstream with respect to different 
watercourses) States. Although approximately one-third of the voting States did not 
endorse the text, they did not reject it either. Only three States, including two important 
upstream riparians, China and Turkey, voted against the text. 
 Finally, introduced by Mexico and co-sponsored by 33 other States,123 the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses124 
was adopted by Resolution of the UN General Assembly on 23 May 1997. This time 104 
States voted in favour, 26 States abstained and again China and Turkey, as well as 
                                               
123 Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Laos, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Korea, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. The representative from Mexico introduced the draft resolution and informed the 
General Assembly that Cameroon, Grenada, Honduras, Jordan, Latvia and Vietnam requested they be 
added as co-sponsors. 
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Burundi, (all upstream States) voted against.125 Several States explained their voting 
positions with respect to the draft resolution.126 Only Bolivia and Spain were critical 
regarding provisions of Articles 5 and 7. France focused primarily on the procedure used 
by the Working Group in adopting the final text, but also expressed some concerns about 
Articles 3, 33 and Part III.  
The voting record in the General Assembly is quite instructive. A solid majority 
of the UN Members, including a significant number of States sharing important 
international watercourses, expressed their support for the Convention. At least half of 
the absent States were island countries with no apparent interest in transboundary water 
resources. Most of the other States in this group could not participate in the final 
deliberations and voting because of unrelated circumstances ranging from military 
conflicts to internal political unrest. With only 3 votes cast against the Convention, the 
level of endorsement makes it one of the most successful international instruments 
recently adopted. This is quite surprising given the difficult, protracted and surrounded by 
controversy history of its drafting. There is no doubt that the final outcome was generally 
acceptable to both upstream and downstream States, which managed to reach a pragmatic 
middle-of-the-road solution.           
   Containing 37 articles with a 14-article Annex, the instrument was opened for 
signature until 20 May 2000. Following is a record of the voting on the UN General 
Assembly Resolution containing the Convention. 
                                               
 
125 UN Doc. A/51/869. 
 

















Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Botswana, 
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Federated 
States of Micronesia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius,  
Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Oman, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi 
Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, 
Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, UK, 

























(*33 States were 
absent)127 
                                               
127 The absent States: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Comoros, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Fiji, Guinea, Lebanon, 
Mauritania, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Palau, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of 
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4.2. UN Watercourses Convention: An Overview128 
The 1997 Convention is a framework instrument which sets forth general 
substantive and procedural provisions to be applied by all Parties irrespective of their 
specific geographical location, or position vis-à-vis other watercourse States, or level of 
development.129 To enter into force, the Convention requires endorsement by 35 States  
before 20 May 2000.130 
 The scope of the Convention covers primarily non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses.131 The latter is defined as “a system of surface and 
groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and 
normally flowing into a common terminus”.132 “Watercourse States”133 and “regional 
economic integration organisations”134 may become Parties to the Convention. Existing 
agreements are not affected by the Convention, but Parties “may consider harmonising 
such agreements with the basic principles” of it.135 Partial agreements are permitted, 
provided that these do not significantly adversely affecting other watercourse States.136 
Where this might occur, the potentially adversely affected State is entitled to participate 
in consultations, and where necessary, negotiations, related to such agreement”.137 
                                               
128 A. Tanzi and M. Arcari (note 62). 
 
129 The UN Watercourses Convention is organised into the following four parts: Part I: 
Introduction (Preamble and Articles 1-4); Part II: General Principles (Articles 5-10); Part III: 
Planned Measures (Articles 11-19); Part IV: Protection, Preservation and Management (Articles 
20-26); Part V: Harmful Conditions and Emergency Situations (Articles 27-28); Part VI: 
Miscellaneous Provisions (Articles 29-33): Part VII: Final Clauses (Articles 34-37); and one Annex 
on Arbitration (Articles 1-14). There also exist an attachment referred to as ”Statements of 
Understanding Pertaining to Certain Articles of the Convention” which refers to Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 
7, 10, 21, 22, 23, 28, and 29 of the Convention. 
130 UN International Watercourses Convention (note 1), Article 34. 
131 Article 1 extends the scope of the Convention to apply to navigational uses “insofar as other 
uses affect navigation or are affected by navigation”. 
132 UN International Watercourses Convention (note 1), Article 2(a); see also Article 2(b) which 
defines “international watercourse” as “a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different 
States”. 
133 Id., Article 1c) defines “Watercourse State” as “ a State Party to the present Convention in 
whose territory part of an international watercourse is situated, or a Party that is a regional 
economic integration organisation, in the territory of one or more of whose Member States part of 
an international watercourse is situated”. 
134 Id., Article 1(d) defines “Regional economic integration organisation” as “an organisation 
constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred 
competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention and which has been duly 
authorised in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to 
it”. 
135 Id., Article 3(1) and 3(2). 
136 Id., Article 3(4). 
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 Part II, “General Principles”, sets forth basic substantive rules applicable to 
international watercourses, having as a cornerstone principle, “equitable and reasonable 
utilisation”, contained in Article 5. Article 7, “Obligation not to cause significant harm”, 
and Article 10, “Relationship between different kinds of uses”, must be read in the 
context of Articles 5, 6 and 7.138 Article 6 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors and an 
indication of how these are to be used, in order to ascertain an equitable and reasonable 
use in accordance with  Article 5. Article 8 imposes a general obligation to cooperate, 
supported, in Article 9, by a requirement for the regular exchange of “readily available 
date and information on the condition of the watercourse”.139 Part III, “Planned 
Measures”, provides a detailed procedural framework for implementing the general 
principles of the Convention in the particular context of planned measures.   
 Part IV, “Protection, Preservation and Management”, contains six articles dealing 
with the “protection and preservation of ecosystems”140 and the promotion of individual 
and, where necessary, joint measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution.141 
Watercourse states are required to consult with each other to achieve this goal.142 There 
are also provisions dealing with “introduction of alien or new species” (Article 22), 
“protection and preservation of the marine environment” (Article 23), “regulation” 
(Article 25), and “installations” (Article 26).  
 Part V deals with “Harmful Conditions and Emergency Situations”, in Articles 27 
(“Prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions”) and Article 28 (“Emergency 
situations”). These offer guidance to States in the event of disasters, water-borne 
diseases, erosion, emergency situations and so forth. Part VI, “Miscellaneous Provisions” 
introduces rules related to armed conflict (Article 29), indirect procedures where there are 
                                               
138
 Wouters (note 7), chapter 3. 
139 UN International Watercourses Convention (note 1), Article 9 refers more specifically to data 
and information of “a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological nature and 
related to the water quality as well as related forecasts”. Where requested, a watercourse State 
shall supply data not readily available “using its best efforts” and for payment of the reasonable 
costs incurred to collect it. States “shall employ their best efforts to collect and, where 
appropriate, to process data and information in a manner which facilitates its utilisation by the 
other watercourse States to which it is communicated”. 
140 Id., Article 20 runs as follows: “Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, 
jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses”. 
141 Id., Article 21 contains 3 subparagraphs which together impose the obligation on watercourse 
States to “prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international watercourse that may 
cause significant harm to other watercourse States or to their environment, including harm to 
human health or safety, to the use of the waters for any beneficial purpose or to the living 
resources of the watercourse”.  
142 Id., Article 21(3) proposes consultations “with a view to arriving at mutually agreeable 
measures and methods to prevent, reduce and control pollution” and includes a list of 
suggestions in this regard. Article 24, “Management”, requires States “at the request of any of 
them” to enter into consultations regarding “the management of an international watercourse 
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serious obstacles to direct contact between watercourse States (Article 30), data vital to 
national defence or security (Article 31), non-discrimination (Article 32), and, settlement 
of disputes (Article 33). The last section, Part VII, “Final Clauses”, includes provisions 
related to ratification, entry into force and authentic texts. The Annex contains the details 
regarding the arbitration procedure referred to in Article 33. 
 
5.  The UN Convention’s Response to Water Scarcity and Water Conflicts 
Nearly a third of the world’s population will face severe water shortages 
in 25 years’ time, increasing the danger of war over water supplies.143 
Unless we change our ways, we will soon be facing a very serious water 
crisis. Consequently, competing claims to water between users within 
countries and between countries will have to be managed in a cooperative 
rather than a confrontational fashion. The needs of the poor and of future 
generations must be secured and issues of quantity and quality of water 
must be addressed”.144 
 What are the issues that watercourse States, externally and internally, have to deal 
with in the era of increasingly scarce transboundary water resources? The primary 
concerns relate to the prevention and resolution of the conflicts of uses resulting from the 
growing competition for diminishing freshwater resources. The three central issues that 
arise in this context are: (a) legal entitlement, (b) framework for allocation, and (c) 
compliance with the agreed watercourse regime. To put it differently: Who has a right to 
use what water -- when, why and how?145 Is the UN Watercourses Convention an 
adequate instrument to respond to these complex questions? How can watercourses States 
employ the Convention to prevent and, if necessary, resolve international disputes over 
water?  
                                               
143 V. Houlder, UN Warns of Water Wars Next Century, Financial Times, 19 March 1999. 
“Research published . . . by the International Water Management Institute, based in Colombo, Sri 
Lanka, predicts “absolute water scarcity” in 17 countries in the Middle East, South Africa and the 
drier regions of western and south India and northern China. Another 24 countries, mainly in sub-
Saharan Africa, will suffer from extreme water scarcity.” 
144 I. Serageldin, Rivers of the World Mismanaged, Polluted, Environment News Service, 29 
November 1999, <http:ens.lycos.com/ens/nov00/1999L-11-29-03.html> (visited 1 December 
1999). I. Serageldin is Chairman of the World Commission on Water for the 21st Century (also 
Chairman of the Global Water Partnership and Vice President of the World Bank). 
145 The who includes stakeholders at various levels; what refers to quality and quantity 
requirements; also relevant are when (i.e. seasonal flows, needs), how (engineering / hydrology) 
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 The UN Convention offers two avenues for determining the legal entitlement to 
use international waters: (a) as defined by existing or future agreements,146 and (b) in 
accordance with the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.147 The mechanisms 
for determining legal entitlement are also set forth in the Convention, primarily through 
its procedural rules,148 including, in the final instance, the dispute settlement 
procedure.149 The process is supported by the provisions requiring consultations,150 joint 
measures and management. 151 
 Where issues of legal entitlement arise, the determination of what is equitable and 
reasonable will constitute the basis of the overall solution, since it is against this 
benchmark that the lawfulness of State’s activities is assessed, unless agreed otherwise. 
How should the principle of reasonable and equitable use be operationalised in a 
particular case? The Convention facilitates this task by providing a broad but non-
exhaustive list of factors to be considered in deciding what qualifies as a reasonable and 
equitable use in any particular case.152 The Convention’s procedural rules establish a 
framework within which States can cooperate, exchange information, provide prior 
notification of planned measures, establish joint management mechanisms, and so forth. 
This is a strength of the Convention: a flexible rule governing legal entitlement, 
accompanied by the requirement of preventive behaviour and complemented by a 
comprehensive set of relatively detailed procedural rules.  
                                               
146 UN International Watercourses Convention (note 1), Article 3. 
147 Id.,  Articles 5, 6, 7, 10 and 21(2), UN Watercourses Convention. 
148 Id., Articles 8, 9 and all of Part III, Planned Measures (Articles 11-19). 
149 Id., Article 33, UN Watercourses Convention. This means involves interpretation of the 
provisions of the Convention and thus will inherently include the primary rule of equitable and 
reasonable use. 
150 Id., Articles 3(5), 4(1), 4(2),6(2) 7(2), 15(1), 15(2), 17(1), 19(3), 21(3), 24, 26(2). 
151 Id., Articles 8(2), 20, 21(2), 21(3), 23,24, 25, 27, 28(4).   
152 Id., Article 6,  “Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilisation:” 
(1) Utilisation of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within the 
meaning of Article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including: 
(a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural 
character; (b) the social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; (c) the effects 
of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse State on other watercourse States; (d) 
existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (e) conservation, protection, development and 
economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to 
that effect; (f) the availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular planned or 
existing use.   
(2)  In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this article, watercourse States concerned shall, when 
the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation. 
(3)  The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison 
with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable share, all 
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 Allocation, or, more accurately, re-allocation of the uses of international waters is 
to be achieved  through a balancing of all factors relevant to each particular case, an 
approach, which stems from  the principle of equitable and reasonable use. According to 
Article 6(2), “the weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance 
in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and 
equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached 
on the basis of the whole”.153 This provision, added by the Working Group of the Whole, 
is taken directly from Article V of the ILA’s Helsinki Rules. The commentary to this 
article is instructive: “In short, no factor has a fixed weight nor will all factors be relevant 
in all cases. Each factor is given such weight as it merits relative to all the other factors. 
And no factor occupies a position of pre-eminence per se with respect to any other factor. 
Further, to be relevant, a factor must aid in the determination of the social and economic 
needs of the co-basin States.”154 This offers support for the proposition that the particular 
interests referred to in Article 10 (vital human needs) and Article 21 (pollution harm) 
must be treated within the allocation framework established under Articles 5, 6 and 7. 155  
Existing uses must also be considered in the same vein, i.e. as  “but one factor”, albeit an 
important one, in the overall assessment of what is reasonable and equitable.156 In short, 
the operational mechanism for the allocation framework established in the UN 
Watercourses Convention, borrowed from the ILA’s Helsinki Rules, is flexible enough to 
permit consideration of all interests relevant to each particular case. 
 Do the rules governing legal entitlement and the framework for allocation 
contained in the Convention respond to conflicts of uses involving the environment? 
Critics claim that the Convention fails to adequately prohibit pollution harm157 and to 
safeguard ecosystems.158 The “mitigated-no-substantial-harm” rule has been 
                                               
153 Id., Article 6(3). 
154 Commentary to Article 6, ILA Helsinki Rules, in: Garretson (note 12), 784. 
155 A. Nollkaemper, The contribution of the International Law Commission to international water 
law: Does it reverse the flight from substance?, in: Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 
vol. XXVII, 1996, 54, agrees that  the legal significance of Articles 10 and 21 “is not that of ‘trump 
norms’ that a priori outweigh conflicting norms. Rather, they will have a slow and diffuse influence 
on the language and idiom of water law. They provide senses of direction, value and purpose 
within which the doctrine of equitable utilisation has to be applied. As such, they may in particular 
cases alter the outcomes of balances of interests.” [footnote reference omitted]. 
156 Commentary to Article 6, ILA Helsinki Rules, in: Garretson (note 12), 785. Article 10, UN 
International Watercourses Convention (note 1), supports this, “In the absence of agreement or 
custom to the contrary, no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other 
uses”. See also, Article VI, ILA Helsinki Rules (note 58). 
157 J.G. Lammers, Balancing the Equities’ in International Environmental Law, in: R.J. Dupuy 
(ed.), The Future of the International Law of the Environment, 1985,153. 
158 J. Brunée, The Challenge to International Law: Water Defying Sovereignty or Sovereignty Defying 
Reality, in: Nação e Defesa, O Desafio das Aguas, Verao 98, no. 86, 51-66; paper presented at International 
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recommended as a remedy to address the first ”shortcoming”.159 This rule “provides a 
less flexible standard” more suited to conflicts over pollution harm, since it permits a 
“limited weighing between the interests which cause transfrontier pollution and the 
interests which are impaired by that pollution”.160 However, applying such a “limited” 
approach may lead to inequitable results. Focusing on the competing interests over 
pollution harm would ignore other relevant factors such as the “existing and potential 
uses of the watercourse”161 and “the availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a 
particular planned or existing use”.162 One could envisage a planned measure that would 
cause transboundary pollution harm that, nonetheless, could be considered to be 
reasonable and equitable given additional arrangements negotiated between the States 
concerned. For example, a planned polluting activity by an upstream State might be 
regarded as a reasonable and equitable use if it is accompanied by effective efforts 
mitigating the adverse impacts in the (downstream) affected State. This may be 
accomplished in a number of ways, including the installation and operation of treatment 
plants in the affected State,163 or even more innovative solutions, such as transboundary 
trading of “virtual water”164 or the swapping of other beneficial uses.165 The idea that 
planned measures involving pollution harm should be subjected to a “limited weighting” 
system aimed at balancing the competing interests of the particularly affected parties 
                                               
159J.G. Lammers (note 157) 153. 
160 J.G. Lammers (note 157), 162. Lammers asserts: “The principle of equitable utilisation or 
apportionment cannot be deemed to apply to instances of transfrontier pollution. It applies to the 
(quantitative) sharing of physically common natural resources such as, e.g. the waters of an 
international watercourse or drainage basin, the capacity of the air to absorb waste gases and 
dust particles without giving rise to air pollution or gas or oil deposits lying across an international 
border”, at 163. In cases of transboundary pollution harm he considers that only a “limited” 
balancing of the equities can take place. 
161 UN International Watercourses Convention (note 1), Article 6(1) (e). 
162 Id., Article 6(1)(g), 
163 Solutions of this kind have been used by Mexico and the USA on the Colorado River, where 
the USA agreed to cover the cost of water treatment plants in Mexico to mitigate the pollution 
originating from uses in the USA. On Lake Geneva, Switzerland devised a scheme whereby it 
pays French authorities upstream to implement pollution prevention measures, thus reducing the 
adverse effects in Switzerland.   
164 T. Allan, Water Scarcity and Water Rights: An Economic Perspective, in: Securing Water 
Rights and Managing Water Scarcity, conference papers (1999, CEPMLP University of Dundee), 
available from R. Carstairs, r.carstairs@dundee.ac.uk. “Virtual water” is a term used to define the 
amount of water which  might be required to produce a given amount of food. In many cases it 
may be less expensive to import the food then to produce it  through costly and inefficient use of 
limited water resources.  
165 The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (note 50), was concluded through agreements between 
Lesotho and South Africa that linked a number of issues. To ensure its access to transboundary 
waters originating upstream in Lesotho, South Africa agreed to cover most of the cost of the large 
dams constructed in Lesotho. These structures, in addition to controlling the downstream flow to 
South Africa of the transboundary waters, also provide Lesotho with hydroelectric power. Thus, a 
solution responding to the very different needs of the two States was arrived at through linkages 
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would reduce the incentive for States to seek more comprehensive solutions to the 
problems.  
 Application of the “mitigated-no-substantial-harm” rule may also lead to unequal 
bargaining positions of States involved in consultations or negotiations over planned 
measures, which may cause pollution harm. Two inequities may result. Firstly, since the 
rule is founded on the prohibition of substantial harm (albeit “mitigated”), the State 
wishing to undertake such a planned measure may find itself in an a priori defensive 
position. Secondly, the focus on “competing interests” increases the likelihood of 
adversarial claims. The principle of equitable and reasonable use, on the contrary, permits 
each State to present all factors relevant to the particular situation, places the parties on 
equal grounds and facilitates, both in process and in substance, a more “needs”-focused 
approach. This, in turn, levels the playing field between the parties and encourages the 
search for solutions by technical experts, as opposed to assertions of legal “rights” 
advanced through a series of claims and counter-claims. This is important, since it is 
likely that the State desiring to undertake the new activities is the less economically 
developed, and, thus, often the “weaker” party in the negotiations.166  
 In sum, the “mitigated-no-substantial-harm” approach, due to its serious 
shortcomings, may negatively affect a watercourse State’s desire and ability to seek 
equitable solutions in their utilisation and development of transboundary waters. The 
principle of equitable and reasonable use has the capacity to consider factors relevant to 
pollution harm, and has the added benefit that this can be done through linkages with 
issues not necessarily tied to pollution, i.e. viewed and addressed in the overall context of 
inter-State relations. The Convention’s approach permits variable “weighting” to be 
given the factors put forward in each particular case and this may often strengthen the 
case against pollution harm. Thus, even insignificant pollution may be considered 
inequitable where it might destroy pristine water resources. Equally, a joint assessment 
by watercourse States of how their water needs may be met, might lead to “trade-offs” of 
economic and other benefits, or to other special arrangements, which may reduce  
polluting activities overall. Such results might not be achievable under the “mitigated-no-
substantial harm” approach. 
The second “green” criticism of the Convention, that it is not an “ecosystem-
oriented” instrument, must be considered in its context. It must be recalled in this respect 
that some proposals to “strengthen” the Draft ILC rules by more emphasis on sustainable 
development, precaution, protection of ecosystems and so forth, and to include these 
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obligations as part of the general principles of the Convention failed to materialise.167 
One explanation for this may be that it was not within the purview of the ILC to address 
water-related environmental issues in great detail. The UN General Assembly requested 
the ILC to “take up the study of the law of international watercourses with a view to its 
progressive development and codification”.168 States were asked to present their views 
“regarding, inter alia, the scope of the proposed study, the uses of water to be considered 
and whether the problem of pollution should be given priority, the need to deal with flood 
control and erosion problems, and the interrelationship between navigational uses and 
other uses”.169 Based on States’ responses170 the ILC recommended the Special 
Rapporteur to rely on the outline of uses contained in question “D” of the questionnaire, 
“but taking into account the various suggestions made by Governments”.171 It was also 
recommended that “pollution problems should, so far as possible, be dealt with in 
connection with the particular uses that give rise to pollution”.172 From the outset States 
focused on the broad range of water uses, including the problem of pollution as one such 
use. Thus, the main task of the ILC was to elaborate rules designed to govern States’ 
behaviour with respect to transboundary waters in light of the entire range of (competing) 
uses, including pollution, but not focusing exclusively on it.  
It is alleged in the same vein that international water law, as embodied in the UN 
Watercourses Convention, lacks the ability to meet the imperatives of environmental 
security and sustainable development. This “unfortunate” trait of the watercourse law is 
rooted primarily in its immediate focus on the interests of the watercourse States and in 
                                               
167 For example, Canada considered Article 5 should take into account recent developments in 
environmental law (UN Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.15, 6), Ethiopia suggested that the principle of 
sustainable development and vital human needs should be in the chapeau of Article 6  (UN Doc. 
A/C.6/51/SR.15, 4), Finland suggested the principles of sustainable development and precaution 
should be included in Part II, General Principles and that Article 6 should refer to sustainable 
development, vital human needs, and the interests of future generations (UN Doc. 
A/C.6/51/SR.15, 2 and 9). Similar views were held by Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Mexico, Portugal, and South Africa. However, the majority of States were generally satisfied with 
the Draft.  
168 UN GA Resolution 2669 (XXV), 8 December 1970. 
169 Report of the International Law Commission to the UN General Assembly, 32nd Session, UN 
Doc. A/35/10, in: Yearbook of International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two, 1980, 104, 105. 
170 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part One, 1976, 150, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/294 and Add.1, para. 6. 
171 Yearbook of International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two, 1980, 104, 106. The uses in 
question D were subdivided into 3 major headings, including, “Agricultural uses”, “Economic and 
commercial uses” and “Domestic and social uses”. 
172 Id., The problem of pollution was highlighted in a separate question in the Commission’s 
questionnaire. Each State was asked whether it was “in favour of the Commission taking up the 
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its sovereignty-based orientation.173 “Rather than reflect the growing range of common 
environmental interests, the law of international watercourses continues to rely primarily 
upon competing sovereign rights of riparian states as conceptual devices for the limitation 
of sovereignty. If international law is to meet the challenges of the water, the principles 
of ecosystem orientation and sustainable development cannot remain at the periphery, but 
must move to the conceptual core of international watercourse law”.174 It is argued, in 
particular, that the customary law principles of equitable utilisation and no significant 
harm “do not effectively address environmental security concerns.”175  
 Thus, there are persistent calls to the effect that the “notion of sustainable 
development must become anchored in international watercourse law”.176 It is asserted 
that the rules and regulations on sustainable water use are not to be found in the 
Watercourses Convention, as opposed to the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 (chapter 18) 
and other non-binding and binding instruments, including the 1992 UN ECE Helsinki 
Convention.177 The latter, in particular, is praised for its ecosystem-oriented approach, 
which puts this instrument in “stark contrast” to the Watercourses Convention.  
It is questionable whether achieving “environmental security”, whatever this term 
may mean in practice,178 should be considered as an ultimate goal of international water 
law; unless, of course, “environmental security” is construed as embracing the entire 
range of water-related economic, developmental as well as environmental interests. 
However, neither the 1997 Watercourses Convention, nor its cornerstone principle of 
equitable and reasonable use is aloof to environmental concerns. The ILC’s normative 
development effort, albeit cautious, to introduce the ecosystem concept to international 
watercourse law has been admitted even by its critics. Rather than paying lip service to 
fashionable but vague and legally imprecise concepts of sustainable development, 
                                               
173 This view, for example, was expressed by E. Hey, International Watercourse Law: Constraints 
on Unilateral Development, in her presentation at the International Water Conference, University 
of Dundee, 11-12 June 1997 (on file with the author). See also A.D. Tarlock, Safeguarding River 
Ecosystems in Times of Scarcity: Irreconciliable Interests?, paper presented at “Securing Water 
Rights and Managing Water Scarcity, International Water Conference, University of Dundee, 7-10 
June 1999 (paper on file with the author). 
174 Brunée (note 158), 6. Brunée and Toope (note 174, 64. To remedy the shortcomings of these 
principles, the authors suggest: (i) elaborating legal concepts “that reach beyond the specific 
water resource at issue and encompass all relevant components of an ecosystem” and (ii) 
reshaping “normative frameworks . . . according to ecological criteria to better reflect both the 
short and long-term needs of ecosystems”, and (iii) shifting emphasis from [a] territorial focus to a 
more ecosystem-oriented approach . . . [which] requires consideration of whole systems rather 
than individual components”, Id., p. 55 [footnote references omitted]. 
175 J. Brunée and S. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: A Case for 
International Ecosystem law, in: Günther Handl (ed.), Yearbook of International Environmental 
Law, vol. 5, 1994, 41, 54.  
176 Id., 67. 
177 Hey (note 173). 
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precaution and intergenerational equity by directly incorporating them, the Convention 
accommodates them in a more subtle but legally meaningful way. As was noted before, 
the “green” provisions of the 1997 Convention - Articles 5, 6, 7, 20, 21 and 23 – 
adequately reflect these notions. They not only allow but require States to protect the 
ecosystems and the environment, as well as to attain optimal and sustainable utilisation 
of an international watercourse.179   
Further, there is an obvious failure to appreciate the amplitude and flexibility of 
the principle of equitable and reasonable use. The perception of what is reasonable and 
equitable is not frozen in perpetuity reflecting the predominant views of, say, the 
beginning of the century. On the contrary, it cannot but change with time in response to 
new problems and challenges. The notion of equity could be invoked and used by 
concerned States in an intertemporal context in order to protect the interests of future 
generations, as well as present, from the abusive current practices. The notion of 
“reasonableness” adds another crucial safeguard against unsustainable water use.  
 One can hardly object to the argument that “equitable utilisation and sustainable 
utilisation are not the same – a use may be equitable as between two parties without 
necessarily being sustainable.”180 But should this necessarily lead to “the most radical re-
writing of the law relating to international watercourses since the River Oder case” in 
order to place the equitable utilisation “in a broader context of sustainable 
development”.181 What about reasonable utilisation – an integral part and requirement of 
the fundamental principle of the watercourse law – so easily forgotten in this line of 
argument? Can unsustainable water utilisation practices be treated today as reasonable, 
given our current knowledge of the interdependence between environment and 
development? Is “reasonable utilisation” not sufficient to fulfil the function of 
“sustainable utilisation”? Is it always necessary to introduce new and new notions, often 
as ambiguous and imprecise, as allegedly the ones to be replaced? 
 As to the preference given to the regional 1992 Helsinki Convention vis-à-vis its 
global counterpart, these are indeed different instruments pursuing different objectives. 
What is necessary and relevant for Europe, the most (apart from North America) 
industrially developed region with capacity to implement the most advanced and far-
reaching environmental requirements, is not always suitable for many other parts of the 
world. While in Europe pollution of transboundary watercourses represent the most 
serious challenge, this is not necessarily the case in other regions, where competition over 
increasingly scarce water resources overshadow all other concerns.  However, even 
within the geographical scope of the Helsinki Convention, many countries, especially in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, find it increasingly hard to comply with 
sophisticated and complex conventional provisions. The often suggested imposition of 
                                               
179 Id., 47.  
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the same requirements on developing nations will in practice make them non-
implementable, which will defeat the very objective of the proposed regime.    
 Finally, it is often contended that “from an environmental protection and security 
perspective, giving priority to the transboundary harm rule is preferable”. 182 Some go 
even further, insisting that “under international watercourse law, …a more established 
principle than that of equitable and reasonable use is the obligation of States not to cause 
significant harm”.183 This view, primarily espoused by the “green” advocates, holds that 
granting priority to the no-harm rule would best ensure environmental protection. It must 
be asked whether implementation of the principle of equitable and reasonable use could 
not accomplish this same goal. Given the increasingly strong environmental pressure, 
there is no doubt that environment interests will always be included among the most 
important “relevant factors” together with an indication of the “strong” weight to be 
given to such factors, in the assessment of a reasonable and equitable use. This, of course, 
will depend on the circumstances particular to each case, which would have to be 
evaluated on its individual merits. Nonetheless, as was already shown, there are 
important advantages for watercourse States to come to the bargaining table under the 
umbrella of equitable utilisation, as compared with the “stick” of no-harm.184 
 The recent decision in the Danube case185 (Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case), between 
Hungary and Slovakia, the only decision involving an international watercourses 
rendered by the International Court of Justice over the last 60 years,186 is particularly 
relevant and instructive in this respect. The decision reanimated the academic debate187 
over the wide range of issues, from the interaction of international environmental law and 
the watercourse law to the role of the concept of sustainable development. This is not the 
place for a detailed analysis of all the issues of that case, however, some of the points 
raised deserve attention. The case revolved primarily around the issues of treaty law, 
particularly the question whether Hungary was justified in suspending and later 
abandoning the construction works on the Danube, which were contemplated and agreed 
to in its 1977 Treaty with Czechoslovakia. Hungary’s refusal to proceed with these works 
                                               
182 Brunnée and Toope (note 174), 63. 
183 Stec and Eckstein (note 34), 45-46. 
184 Brunnée and Toope (note 174), 63. This appears to be acknowledged by some of the critics, 
“While from an environmental protection and security perspective, giving priority to the 
transboundary harm rule is preferable”, the cooperative aspect inherent in the equitable use 
principle brings an equally important element of balance to environmental relations among 
States”.  
185 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (note 34).[hereinafter Danube decision]. 
186 The last ICJ case which involved an international watercourse was the River Meuse case; see judgement 
of 28 June 1937, Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B, No. 70, 3. 
187 Bourne, Boyle, Canelas de Castro, Stec and Eckstein (note 34); also A. Kiss, Legal 
Procedures Applicable to Interstate Conflicts on Water Scarcity: The Gabcikovo Case, in: Brans 
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prompted Slovakia to implement a “provisional solution”, which involved construction of 
a dam in its own territory and a temporal diversion of the Danube waters. Each side 
claimed that the other had breached its international obligations under either the 1977 
Treaty or general international law.  
 The Hungary’s position was based mostly on the allegations that irreversible 
environmental harm would result from the implementation of the works. It tried to justify 
its unilateral termination of the 1977 Treaty by the reference to a “state of ecological 
necessity”. The Court rejected this argument, having not found that the situation was of a 
“grave and imminent peril” that would threaten an “essential interest” of Hungary. The 
Court also supported and confirmed the legal validity of the 1977 Treaty. Regarding 
Slovakia’s unilateral diversion of the Danube, the Court referred to Hungary’s “basic 
right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international 
watercourse”.188 The Court found that Slovakia “failed to respect the proportionality 
required by international law”189 and thus deprived Hungary of its “right to an equitable 
share of the natural resources of the Danube”.190 The Court added:   
 Modern development of international law has strengthened the principle 
expressed in the River Oder case that “the community of interest" in a 
navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal interest for non-
navigational uses of international watercourses.191  
To sum up, the Court found Hungary in breach of its international obligations 
under the 1977 Treaty and found also that Slovakia had violated international law by 
putting into operation its provisional solution. In so doing, the Court emphasised, in 
particular, the importance of balancing environmental and developmental concerns.192 
The parties to the dispute were requested by the Court to conduct negotiations to ensure 
continued compliance by each side with the 1977 Treaty. These negotiations were to find 
“an agreed solution that takes into account the [1997] Treaty . . . as well as the norms of 
international environmental law and the principles of the law of international 
watercourses”. 193  
                                               
188 Danube decision (note 6), para. 78. 
189Id., para. 85. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id., the Danube case, the judgement including the dissenting opinion of Judge Oda (“Any 
construction work relating to economic development would be bound to affect the existing 
environment to some extent but modern technology would . . . be able to provide some 
acceptable ways of balancing the two conflicting interests”), p. 224; and separate opinion of 
Judge Weeramantry (“. . .in the arena of international law . . . there must be both development 
and environmental protection, and neither of these rights can be neglected”), p. 213.  
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 The decision is important in many respects. It explicitly referred to the 1997 
Watercourses Convention as an authoritative statement of the law of international 
watercourses. It is particularly remarkable given the fact that by that time the 1997 
Convention had not been ratified by a single State. The Court also implicitly endorsed the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation as a governing principle of the 
watercourse law. The ICJ decision contained “no mention of the sterile and misconceived 
debate over the relationship between Articles 5 and 7” of the UN Watercourses 
Convention.194 This happened for one simple reason: the Court was unable to ascertain 
any significant environmental harm inflicted on Hungary, apart from a legal injury to its 
sovereign right to a reasonable and equitable share of the Danube waters. If the situation 
had been different, i.e. if there had been prove of significant harm resulting from the 
actions of Slovakia, the Court could not easily avoid dealing with this issue. 
 Apart from the environment focused criticism, the Convention is often maligned 
as offering no fixed formula for determining legal entitlement,195 or indeed, as being void 
of any substantive rules.196  The latter observation is quite surprising given the number of 
well-established customary rules of international law, such as the principles of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation, no-significant harm and the procedural rules of prior 
notification and exchange of information, codified by the Convention. The former 
comment, however, merits closer examination. It is claimed that “the principle of 
equitable use justifies opposing claims . . . without offering a resolution . . .  [it] is little 
more than an open-ended framework for political compromise without an independent 
legal identity”.197 It appears, on the contrary, that the very fact that this principle does 
“justify opposing claims . . . without offering a resolution” must be considered as a 
particular strength of the Convention, since it leaves each case involving competing 
claims to be judged (and not pre-judged) on its own merits. This may, or may not, result 
in a “political compromise”, but the rule, and its implementation, have an independent 
legal identity  tied to the broader legal concept of allocational fairness. This is especially 
relevant to the management of scarce water resources, “when moderate scarcity threatens 
to become unmanageable scarcity unless some means of allocation is devised which caps 
what would otherwise be an unbridled and ultimately self-defeating scramble for too little 
by too many.198 It is correctly asserted that an allocational choice “must meet the test of 
perceived fairness [if] it is to suceed in allocating. . . . the pursuit of a shared perception 
                                               
194 Boyle (note 34), 16.  
195 Nollkaemper, (note 156), 46. 
196 Hey (note 172). E. Hey expressed similar views in a working document prepared jointly with  E. 
Mostert, E. van Beek, N. Bouman, H. Savenije, and W. Thissen,  River Basin Management and Planning, 
distributed as working document for  International Workshop on River Basin Management (note 26) (on 
file with the author). 
197 Nollkaemper (note 157), 46. See also Wolf (note 7), 3.  
198 T. Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System, in: General Course on 
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of fairness is the necessary starting point for devising any lasting allocation rules, rules 
that are likely to command respect and pull towards voluntary compliance”.199 A rule of 
allocation that assigns certain factors (such as “no-significant harm”, pollution 
prevention, protection of the environment and vital human needs) special priority, 
unequivocally, may foreclose the possibility of seeking fair and legitimate solutions. A 
system of “automatic trumping entitlement” precludes not only agreement, but 
“negotiated agreement”, which becomes superfluous in such a context.200 A rule 
providing general principles guiding allocation may be vague, but, “to some extent 
indeterminacy is inherent in all rule-creating discourse”.201  This indeterminacy, 
however, may lead to legitimacy gains “achieved when a law’s standard opens a fairness-
discourse and avoids a rigid standard that may produce extreme unfairness in 
practice”.202 This certainly may be the case here. 203 
 The open-ended principle of equitable and reasonable use should not be regarded 
as a unique legal phenomenon. One can refer to a number of legal standards based 
“reasonableness” or “equity”. For example, the cornerstone rule of the law of torts, the 
“reasonable man (woman) test” has worked well in hundreds of years of litigation, and 
continues to do so. Is there any reason that a “reasonable use” approach could not also 
work well in practice?204 In the international law of the sea, “equitable principles” 
established themselves as both the primary method and ultimate goal of delimitation, as 
opposed to the more concrete method of equidistance. Given the Convention’s detailed 
and extensive requirements for consultations, cooperation, exchange of information, prior 
notification and joint measures, the foundation is laid for a “fairness discourse” based on 
needs, as compared with the more adversarial, rights-based claims. The principle of 
reasonable and equitable use undoubtedly incorporates factors related to protection of 
vital human needs, protection of ecosystems and the sustainability of water use.205  
Further, a watercourse State’s needs may be met through mechanisms not necessarily 
                                               
199 Id. 
200 Id., 36. In addition to this important no-trumping principle, there is at least one other which, 
despite disagreement by some on political and philosophical grounds, may be coming close to 
universal acceptance as a core principle of fairness. The principle is this: that inequalities in the 
access to, or the distribution of, goods must be justified by demonstrating that the inequality of 
benefits not only its beneficiaries, but also, in absolute terms, everyone else.” . 
201 Id., 33. 
202 Id., 51. 
203 E. Benvenisiti, Collective Action in the Utilisation of Shared Water Resources, American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 90, 1996, 384. Benvenisti believes that a vague standard of equitable use is more 
acceptable than a clear rule such as no significant harm.  A vague standard increases the likelihood of co-
operation by encouraging riparian states to negotiate rather than litigate, which in turn allows for changed 
circumstances by incorporating flexibility into the agreed-upon initial allocation. 
204 Bourne (note 66), at 83 refers to the “reasonable State” test. 
205 These three factors are considered to “emerging substantive concepts” that challenge the 
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directly connected to “blue” water206 management and allocation. Instead, solutions 
based on a broader approach may result in a more efficient use of transboundary water 
resources.207    
 
6. Issues of Implementation and Compliance 
The implementation of the principle of equitable and reasonable use can be 
facilitated through the work of effective institutional mechanisms.208 While some 
watercourse States have resisted joint management,209 many watercourse agreements 
establish an international body with a specific mandate to supervise their implementation. 
Such organs could play an important role in monitoring, and even facilitating, compliance 
and dispute avoidance.210 Special Rapporteur Schwebel stated: 
Ideally, system States should create, where they have not already done so, 
the necessary machinery for authoritative ascertainment of equitable 
utilisation whenever the need arises. And this machinery for ascertainment 
of equitable use, as well as for working out the technical and 
compensatory adjustments that often are required, should not in the first 
place be considered "dispute settlement". Rather, such determinations, 
including where necessary their attendant, often complex, shaping of the 
package of modifications of use and of measures for avoidance of harm, 
need to be an integral part of the system States' affirmative cooperation in 
their international watercourse system. In the past, such machinery has 
been lacking in most international watercourse systems, and the defensive, 
                                               
206 “Blue” water refers to surface and groundwater resources, which represents an insignificant 
amount of the world’s water resources; see Falkenmark (note 22).  
207 One such example is a recent decision of the Aral Sea basin States to create a mechanism of 
“trading” water resources needed downstream for irrigation in exchange for other energy 
resources.  
208 L. Caflisch, The Law of International Waterways in its Institutional Aspects, Festschrift für Dietrich 
Schindler, 1989, 21. See also Recommendations and Guidelines on Sustainable River Basin Management, 
Workshop Report, International Workshop on River Basin Management (note 26) (on file with the author), 
also available at http://www.ct.tudelft.nl/rba/rba.htm. 
    209 A.E. Utton, Water Quality, in: A.E. Utton  and L.A.Teclaff (eds.), International Environmental Law, 
1974. Utton’s survey of State practice in Latin America, Europe, the former Soviet Union and North 
America leads him to conclude that States invoke “State sovereignty” in support of their refusal of joint 
management.  
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one might say "adversary", context within which use conflicts were taken 
up all too often gave rise to acrid and protracted disputes.211 
 The 1997 Watercourses Convention addresses these issues in a number of ways. 
Firstly, by permitting economic integration organisations212 (REIOs) to become parties, it 
encourages their members to make coordinated efforts within such organisations in 
achieving the objectives of the Convention. It is noteworthy that the EU Draft Water 
Framework Directive refers to both the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention and the 1992 
Helsinki Convention as the guiding international instruments with respect to the 
European Community transboundary water resources. Secondly, by consistently referring 
to joint mechanisms, it encourages States to establish such mechanisms in order “to 
facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light of the experience 
gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various 
regions.”213 Article 24 clarifies what kinds of “management” joint commissions might 
undertake.214  
These measures are important not only in managing water scarcity and avoiding 
dispute, but also in facilitating compliance. However, the UN Watercourses Convention, 
apart from the dispute settlement provisions215 and a reference to non-discrimination,216 
offers no other guidance to States on how they might attempt to ensure the integrity of 
their watercourse regimes. While this would appear consistent with state practice in the 
                                               
211 Schwebel (note 85), 89. 
212 UN International Watercourses Convention (note 1), Art. 2(d) provides “regional economic integration 
organisation” means an organisation constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member 
States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention and which has been 
duly authorised in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it”. 
 213 Id., Art. 8(2). 
214 Id., Article 24(2),  “For the purposes of this article, “management” refers in particular, to: (a) 
Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse and providing for the 
implementation of any plans adopted; and (b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal 
utilisation, protection and control of the watercourse”. 
215 Id., Article 33. 
216 Id., Article 32, “Non-discrimination” provides, “Unless the watercourse States concerned have agreed 
otherwise for the protection of the interests of persons, natural or juridical, who have suffered or are under 
a serious threat of suffering significant transboundary harm as a result of activities related to an 
international watercourse, a watercourse State shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence 
or place where the injury occurred, in granting to such persons, in accordance with its legal system, access 
to judicial or other procedures, or a right to claim compensation or other relief in respect of significant 
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field,217 a regional model for the elaboration of a strategy and framework for compliance 
is currently evolving under the auspices of the UN ECE, in particular, under the umbrella 
of the 1992 Helsinki Convention.218 The Parties to that instrument are at present engaged 
in developing a strategy and framework for compliance verification and facilitation.219 
The London Protocol on Water and Health220 and the Aarhus Convention,221 both 
concluded under the auspices of the UN ECE, each contain provisions regarding the 
monitoring of compliance. It is clear that measures aimed at facilitating compliance, 
based on a non-confrontational and non-judicial approach, can go a long way to ensure 
the ongoing peaceful regulation of international watercourses. The topic is a complex 
                                               
217 Most international water treaties make no reference to monitoring compliance, providing 
instead for dispute settlement mechanisms, or granting joint commissions limited mandates to 
facilitate cooperation. See, inter alia, the Mekong Treaty , Boundary Waters Treaty (Canada-
USA), Indus Waters Treaty, Rio de la Plata Treaty. Compliance appears to be a topic not 
addressed in the “water law” context, although it takes a prominent place in international 
environmental law discourse. See, generally, R. Wolfrum, hague course, J. Werksman book on 
compliance; articles by Peter Sand; articles by E. Brown Weiss.     
218 Article 17 (2), Helsinki Watercourses Convention provides: “At their meetings, the Parties shall 
keep under continuous review the implementation of this Convention, and, with this purpose in 
mind, shall, . . . (f) consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the 
achievement of the purposes of this Convention”. The Convention also requires Riparian Parties 
to conclude further agreements which “shall provide for the establishment of joint bodies” with a 
list of proposed tasks. In accordance with this provision, a number of Parties to the Helsinki 
Convention have entered into such agreements; see Agreements on the Protection of the Rivers 
Scheldt and Meuse, 26 April 1994, reprinted in 34 ILM 851 (1995); Convention on Cooperation for 
the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River Basin, 29 June 1994, reprinted in 19 
International Environment Reports (BNA) 997 (30 October 1996); 1998 Rhine Convention;  
219 See “The Need for a Strategy and Framework for Compliance with Agreements on 
Transboundary Waters and Guidelines on Public Participation in Water Management”, UN ECE 
MP. WAT/2000/  (December 1999); (on file with the author). The Work Plan of the Parties to the 
Helsinki Convention refers specifically to preparation of a Compliance Review Procedure for 
consideration by the Parties. 
220 On 17 June 1999, 35 countries signed the Protocol on Water and Health to the UN/ECE 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. 
(Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom). The 
Protocol’s aim is to reduce, control and prevent water-related disease. See Press Release, 
ECE/ENV/99/6, 18 June 1999, Geneva, http://www.unece.org/press/99env6e.htm.  Article 15 of 
the Water and Health Protocol specifically requires the Parties to establish multilateral 
arrangements of a non-confrontational, non-judicial and consultative nature for reviewing 
compliance 
221 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998,  < http://www.unece.org/env/europe/ppconven.htm >  (visited on 10 
December 1999). Article 15 of the Aarhus Convention provides, “Review of Compliance: The meeting of 
the Parties shall establish, on a consensus basis, optional arrangements of a non- confrontational, non-
judicial and consultative nature for reviewing compliance with the provisions of this Convention. These 
arrangements shall allow for appropriate public involvement and may include the option of considering 
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one, not yet fully studied in the context of transboundary watercourses.222 Public 
participation, an important element of a compliance review process, is another area that 
could be further examined in the context of international watercourse regimes. It is 
strongly recommended that States consider compliance and public participation when 
they negotiate their international watercourse agreements. 
 
7.  Beyond the UN Convention: The Need for an Interdisciplinary Response to  
     Water Scarcity 
Sustainable river basin management requires proper study, sound 
understanding and effective management of water systems and their 
inherent components and processes (groundwater, surface water and 
return water; quantity and quality; biotic components; upstream and 
downstream relations. . . . the water itself should be seen as a social, 
environmental, and economic resource, and each of these three aspects 
must be represented in the political discourse.”223 
Development was long seen as a function of economics and engineering. 
More recently, social scientists, political scientists and environmentalists 
have started to play an increasingly important role in what has come to be 
called ‘sustainable development.’ For development to be truly sustained, 
however, it has to be a comprehensive process in which all disciplines and 
professions fully participate. Law, in particular, as the formal instrument 
of orderly change in society, plays a pivotal role, even though this role has 
not always been readily recognised. 224 
 The complex issues arising out of water scarcity, generally, and in matters relating 
to legal entitlement, framework for allocation, and monitoring compliance, in particular, 
require more than a legal response. The input of the technical water experts, across the 
entire horizon of water resources management, including engineers, hydrologists, 
economists, social scientists, and so forth, is equally important.225 A range of experts is 
required to identify the factors relevant to the determination of an equitable and 
                                               
222 P. Wouters, “Ensuring the Integrity of International Watercourses Agreements: Compliance in 
the Making”, working paper (work-in-progress on file with the author). 
223 Recommendations and Guidelines on Sustainable River Basin Management, prepared by 
panel of international water experts at The Hague, 29 October 1999. To be presented at World 
Water Vision ministerial forum, March 2000 in the Hague [Hague 1999 Recommendations]. 
224 I.F.I Shihata, Good Governance and the Role of Law in Economic Development in Ann 
Seidman, Robert B. Seidman, Thomas W. Waelde (eds), Making Development Work (1999), xvii. 
225 The UN initiative, HELP (Hydrology for Environment, Life and Policy) represents a significant 
paradigmatic shift from the past “expert” orientation of the scientific community towards a much 
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reasonable use. New concepts, such as “green” water226 and “virtual” water227 could be 




The legal response to water scarcity has a solid foundation in the UN 
Watercourses Convention. Its primary rule of equitable and reasonable utilisation, 
supplemented by the requirement of  preventive behaviour in Article 7 and a well 
developed body of procedural rules, provides States a comprehensive framework to 
address the multitude of issues arising out of  present and future conflicts over water. The 
German Government’s initiative to encourage ratification of the UN Convention228 is 
well-founded. Regardless of whether or not the Convention comes into force, it is 
destined to play a major role in the management of transboundary watercourses as an 
authoritative statement of relevant international law. 
                                               
226 M. Falkenmark, Competing Freshwater, (note ).  Falkenmark asserts, “Sustainable water-
dependent socio-economic development will simply not be possible without taking an integrated 
perspective on all water dependent and water-impacting activities in a river basin and their 
relative upstream-downstream relations.  . . . The river basin approach has to involve attention 
not only to green and blue freshwater services, but also to water-related ecosystem services, 
terrestrial as well as aquatic, and direct as well as indirect.” M. Falkenmark, “Competing 
Freshwater and Ecological Services in the River Basin Perspective”, presentation at 9th 
Stockholm Water Symposium (August 1999). 
227 See T. Allan (note). 
228 Statement made at International Water Conference, “Securing Water Rights and Managing 
Water Scarcity”, 7-10 June 1999, Dundee, Scotland. 
